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FEDERALISM AND CRIMINAL LAW: WHAT THE
FEDS CAN LEARN FROM THE STATES
Rachel E. Barkow*
Criminal law enforcement in the United States is multi-
jurisdictional. Local, state, and federal prosecutors all possess the
power to bring criminal charges. An enduring question of crimi-
nal law is how authority should be allocated among these levels
of government. In trying to gain traction on the question of when
crime should be handled at the federal level and when it should be
left to local authorities, courts and scholars have taken a range of
approaches. Oddly, one place that commentators have not looked
for guidance on how to handle the issue of law enforcement allo-
cation is within the states themselves. States have the option of
vesting authority in a state-level actor-typically, the attorney
general-or in local district or county attorneys. This choice, like
the choice between federal and state authority, also requires a
balancing of the advantages of centralization against the loss of
local values. How states choose to strike that balance is therefore
informative for the question of local versus federal authority in
that states are weighing the same issues.
This Article accordingly looks to the states for guidance on when
criminal enforcement responsibility should rest with local authori-
ties and when it should reside with a more centralized actor (be it
one at the state or federal level). A comprehensive empirical
survey of criminal law enforcement responsibility in the states-
including a review of state codes and caselaw and interviews with
state prosecutors-reveals remarkable similarity among the states
about the degree of local control that is desirable. The states are
virtually unanimous in their deference to local prosecutors, the rela-
tively small number of categories they identify for centralized
authority in a state-level actor and their support of local prosecution
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efforts with resources instead of direct intervention or case appro-
priation. The state experience thus provides an alternative model of
central-local cooperation to the one used at the federal level.
The Article explains that a main source of the difference in ap-
proach is sentencing policy. In the states, questions of procedure
and sentencing are irrelevant to the allocation of power because
they are the same at both levels of government. States thus serve as
laboratories where sentencing differences and variation in proce-
dural rules are taken out of the equation and the focus is on
institutional competence. In contrast, the federal government typi-
cally decides whether to vest authority in federal prosecutors based
on whether or not it agrees with local sentencing judgments. Be-
cause sentencing proves to be so central to federal prosecutions of
local crime, the Article concludes by urging those interested in fed-
eralism to pay greater attention to the role of sentencing as a driver
of the federal government's decision to get involved with questions
of local crime.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal law enforcement in the United States is multi-jurisdictional.
Local, state, and federal prosecutors all possess the power to bring criminal
charges. An enduring question of criminal law is how authority should be
allocated among these levels of government. The Supreme Court has wres-
tled repeatedly with the issue of how the Constitution allocates criminal
power between the federal government and the states.' The first significant
shot fired in the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution was United States
v. Lopez,2 in which the Court held that Congress overreached in passing the
Gun-Free School Zones Act because the possession of a gun near a school
zone was a matter for localities, not the federal government. Indeed, juris-
diction over crime-and the power to strip an individual of liberty-is the
quintessential question of federalism and state power.
Scholars have also relentlessly pursued the issue of when crime should
be a matter of federal concern and when it should be left to local prosecu-
tors.' In trying to gain traction on the question of when crime should be
handled at the federal level and when it should be left to local authorities,
commentators have taken a range of approaches. While the Court is limited
to what the Constitution says about the division of power between federal
and state governments, scholars are free to approach the question from a
normative perspective, and they have considered arguments rooted in eve-
rything from political economy to civic republicanism to varying
procedural advantages offered by different jurisdictions. These methods
1. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the application of the Con-
trolled Substances Act against a federalism challenge); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (invalidating a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence under the Commerce Clause);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990
because the prohibited conduct did not substantially affect interstate commerce); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the federal loan-sharking statute as a valid use of Congress's
Commerce Clause power).
2. 514 U.S. 549.
3. For a sampling of the vast scholarly debate, see William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121
HARv. L. REV. 1969 (2008) (addressing the relationship between equality and the location of law
enforcement); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995) (arguing that there are too
many federal prosecutions given the capacity of the federal courts and criticizing intermittent federal
enforcement because of the disparities it produces in similar cases); Rory K. Little, Myths and Prin-
ciples of Federalization, 46 HASTINGs L.J. 1029 (1995) (providing an overview of the federalism
debate); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POt'Y 247 (1997).
4. See infra Section I.A.
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are all designed to answer the same question of when a centralized, uniform
approach is preferable to local variation.
Oddly, one place scholars have not looked for guidance is within the
states themselves: specifically, how states handle the issue of law enforce-
ment allocation. There are, after all, three layers of prosecution in the
United States, not two. States have the option of vesting authority in a state-
level actor-typically, the attorney general-or in local district or county
attorneys. This choice, like the choice between federal and state authority,
also requires a balancing of the advantages of centralization against the loss
of local values. The internal allocation of prosecution responsibility within
the states is important and interesting in its own right. But how states choose
to strike the balance between local and centralized authorities is also infor-
mative for the question of local versus federal authority because states are
weighing the same issues. If states are to be seen as laboratories of experi-
ment,5 this is surely an area where the results bear on federal policy, not just
the policies of other states.
Indeed, this intrastate perspective is particularly valuable because states
have the primary responsibility for law enforcement in the United States and
typically must pay the incarceration costs for those prosecuted, whether by
local-level or state-level prosecutors. If local prosecutors are not using state
prison resources effectively or are imposing externalities on other intrastate
jurisdictions, states should have a greater incentive to intervene than the
federal government because they pick up the tab for the state's prison costs
with their limited budgets. Moreover, inefficient crime fighting is far more
likely to have spillover effects within a state than across state lines because
most criminal activity, and particularly violent criminal activity, likely stays
within a local area. The federal government, in contrast, is not on the front-
lines of most criminal law enforcement efforts and instead picks the cases it
wishes to pursue.' The law enforcement portion of the federal budget is
comparably minuscule, and it serves no disciplining effect on decision mak-
ing.9 Because of these practical realities, states are more likely than
5. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
6. State prisons are run and funded by state governments. Robert L. Misner, Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 719-20 (1996). Local jails, which
generally house misdemeanor offenders and state prisoners while their cases are pending, are funded
by local jurisdictions. States have made some efforts recently to shift incarceration costs to localities
by making greater use of local jails, but states continue to pay the lion's share of incarceration costs.
See, e.g., Molly Hennessy-Fiske & Richard Winton, Bid to divert California prisoners to county
jails denounced, L.A. TIMEs, May 23, 2009, at A8 (reporting on complaints about plans to divert
state prisoners to local jails in order to shift costs of incarceration to local jurisdictions); Amy Gard-
ner, Board Weighs Suing State Over Crowded Jails, WASH. PosT, June 3, 2008, at B5 (same).
7. Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713,
1715-16 (2006) (disputing claims that many criminals will cross state boundaries); Samuel R.
Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It Really Happen?, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1725, 1727 (2006) ("[T]o the extent that differences in policy might cause criminals
to relocate, we expect them to travel as little as possible.").
8. See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1276, 1305-06 (2005).
9. Id. at 1301-08.
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Congress to consider the costs and benefits associated with how criminal
law enforcement should be allocated. All else being equal, states have strong
incentives to get the right mix of law enforcement to maximize the use of
their prison resources. States therefore offer a helpful comparative frame-
work for the question of when local law enforcement makes sense and when
it does not.
This Article accordingly looks to the states for guidance on when crimi-
nal enforcement responsibility should rest with local authorities and when it
should reside with a more centralized actor (be it one at the state or federal
level). Part I begins by explaining how knowledge of intrastate practice fills
a void in the existing debate over the federalization of crime. Part I argues
that state legislatures and Congress are making similar choices about when
to share authority with or take matters over from local prosecutors. In addi-
tion, the relationship between central state prosecutors (typically attorneys
general) and local prosecutors can, to some extent, be analogized to the rela-
tionship between Main Justice and U.S. attorneys' offices and between
federal prosecutors and local prosecutors. Part I acknowledges important
differences in these relationships but explains that the variation is also a val-
uable basis for comparison, because to the extent institutional and political
differences are driving the allocation decision, one can then assess the nor-
mative worth of those differences.
Part II takes up the task of describing the actual practice in the states.
The information in Part II is based on a comprehensive empirical survey of
criminal law enforcement responsibility in the states, including a review of
state codes and caselaw and interviews with state prosecutors. What is most
striking about this data is the remarkable similarity among states regarding
the degree of local control that is desirable and how to accomplish it. The
states are virtually unanimous in their deference to local prosecutors, the
small number of categories they identify for centralized authority in a state-
level actor, and their support of local prosecution efforts with resources
instead of direct intervention or case appropriation.
Part III compares the states' approach with the federal government's
push toward centralization and away from local control. It goes on to ex-
plain a main reason for the difference. Whereas the states are focused
directly on the relative institutional competence of prosecutors at the state
and local level, the federal government is just as likely to make prosecutorial
allocation decisions based on whether or not it agrees with local sentencing
judgments. Because sentencing proves to be so central to federal prosecu-
tion of local crime, the Conclusion urges those interested in federalism to
pay greater attention to the role of sentencing as a driver of the federal gov-
ernment's decision to get involved with questions of local crime.
I. THE FEDERALISM DEBATE IN CRIMINAL LAW
Over the last several decades, federal criminal law has mushroomed be-
yond recognition. The number of federal criminal laws now hovers
somewhere over 4,000, with roughly 40% of the laws passed after the Civil
523February 20111
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War coming in the 25-year period between 1970 and 1998.0 Many of these
laws are written in sweepingly broad terms," overlap with one another,12 and
cover ground already addressed by state law, including violent crimes. Of-
ten, new federal laws are passed or existing laws are expanded in the wake
of a highly publicized crime, with little analysis of whether there is an actual
need for federal involvement.14 The result is a federal prison population that
is now larger than the prison population of any single jurisdiction" and a
federal docket of almost 70,000 criminal cases annually, roughly double the
figure from 25 years earlier. The number of drug cases in particular has
10. Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIo ST.
J. CRIM. L. 369, 392, 399 (2009) (citing TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw, AM.
BAR Ass'N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]).
11. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505,
512-19 (2001).
12. Id. at 519.
13. Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A
Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAw & Soc. INQuImY 239, 244 (2005) ("[O]nly
about 5% of all federal criminal cases involved federal statutes with no local or state counterpart.")
(citations omitted); Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34
CRIME & JUST. REv. RES. 377, 382 (2006) ("[It was not until 1964 that such street crimes became
the subject of sustained federal policy making ... however, federal movement into this area quickly
went from a trot to a gallop . . . ."); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L.
REV. 879, 880-81 (2005); see also Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Crim-
inal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (1997) (noting several ways in which the sentencing
procedures for federal criminal convictions result in harsher sentences than the equivalent sentences
under state sentencing regimes).
14. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 14-17 ("New crimes are often enacted in patchwork re-
sponse to newsworthy events, rather than ... in response to an identifiable federal need."); Sara Sun
Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederaliza-
tion, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 747, 755 (2005) ("Federal criminal law ... [contains] legislation drafted in
response to whatever crime is the focal point in the media-even if that offense is already defined
and punished harshly and effectively under state law."); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal
"Code" is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643,
654 (2006) ("[Riedundancies [in the federal code] again can be traced largely to the political desire
to react to a given scandal .. . by enacting a 'new' section that simply repeats existing prohibitions
(and by jacking up statutory maximum penalties to underscore congressional resolve).").
15. HEATHER C. WEST & WILLIAM J. SABOL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON IN-
MATES AT MIDYEAR 2008-STATISTICAL TABLES (March 2009), available at http//bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
content/pub/pdf/pim08st.pdf (noting there were 201,142 federal prisoners at mid-year 2008 com-
pared to 173,320 in California, the state with the largest prison population). To give a sense of
perspective of the growth of the federal prison system, the federal government did not even open a
federal prison until 1895, and had only 5 as of 1930. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The
Federalization ofAmerican Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1147 (1995). Between 1930 and
1989, however, the number of prisons grew to 47, and the population of federal prisoners went from
13,000 to 53,000. Id. at 1147-48. In the last 20 years, the number of federal prisons has more than
doubled to 115 institutions and the population has almost quadrupled with a population of more than
209,000 prisoners. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, About the Bureau of Prisons, http://www.bop.goviabout/
index.jsp (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
16. Beale, supra note 10, at 400 & n.173. The number of federal criminal cases has not
followed a steady upward trajectory. In 1932, there were more than 86,000 federal criminal cases.
Little, supra note 3, at 1040.
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exploded, rising approximately 300% in the stretch from 1980 to 1990" and
another 45% from 1990 to 2000."
An additional, roughly contemporaneous trend has been the centraliza-
tion of prosecutorial power within the federal government.,9 Increasingly,
the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. ("Main Justice") has sought
to control the charging and plea decisions of federal prosecutors. Main Jus-
tice has issued a series of directives establishing charging practices in
federal criminal cases against individuals and corporations, 20 and the United
States Attorneys'Manual covers more specific policies. Federal prosecutors
have also been ordered to seek approval from or provide notice to Main Jus-
tice with respect to two hundred types of decisions,2' including whether to
bring cases under a variety of criminal statutes (such as the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act),22 deciding whether or not to seek the
death penalty in death-eligible cases,23 and obtaining a wiretap.24 Main Jus-
tice has also spent more time keeping track of local statistics on which cases
are brought, with an eye toward controlling the mix. 25 The firing of U.S. at-
torneys in 2006 may have been, in the words of the Main Justice's inspector
general and Office of Professional Responsibility, "fundamentally flawed"
and "severely damag[ing]" to the Department's credibility,26 but it was nev-
ertheless consistent with these other attempts to shift power over criminal
law enforcement to Main Justice." Main Justice has also grown increasingly
17. Brickey, supra note 15, at 1153.
18. Many Factors Influence Criminal Filings Over 10-Year Period, THIRD BRANCH, Nov.
2001, at 6.
19. Beale, supra note 10, at 397-405 (chronicling the power shift to Main Justice); Kate
Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J.
1420, 1440-43 (2008) (describing Main Justice's efforts to centralize power since the late 1980s).
20. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (set-
ting forth Justice Department's charging and plea policies); Memorandum from Richard
Thornburgh, Attorney Gen., to All U.S. Attorneys, Setting Forth Justice Dep't's Plea Policies (Mar.
13, 1989), reprinted in 6 FED. SENTENCING REP. 297, 347 (1994).
21. Beale, supra note 10, at 402 & n. 187.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-110.101, 9-110.300
to 9-110.400 (1997).
23. Id. § 9-10.040. For discussions of this practice, see John Gleeson, Supervising Federal
Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend
Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REv. 1697 (2003), and Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
347 (1999).
24. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-7.010.
25. Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking
Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087, 2097 (2009).
26. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBIL-
ITY, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006, at 356, 358 (Sept.
2008).
27. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation
of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIo ST. L.J. 187, 187-88 (2008) (claiming the firings exemplify "the
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vocal about the need to check regional variations among judges in their sen-
tencing practices, another sign of its desire to have a central, uniform
approach to federal criminal law.2
Like the expansion of the federal criminal code, these efforts to give
Main Justice more centralized authority come at the expense of local control
over criminal enforcement. U.S. attorneys may be federal appointees, but
they are more responsive to local interests than Main Justice.2 9 They are typ-
ically drawn from the district in which they serve, and they necessarily pay
attention to the local values and practices in their district.30 U.S. attorneys
and federal judges in a district are also more likely than Main Justice to take
into account the attitudes and values of local juries in making their deci-
sions. Thus, to the extent Main Justice takes on a decision-making role for
itself or orders a particular standard that disregards local jury preferences,'
that too has the effect of stripping local communities of some of their law
32
enforcement power.
The increasing use of federal criminal law to address local crime has
hardly gone unnoticed. The federal judiciary was one of the first institutions
to offer critical commentary. The Federal Courts Study Committee cau-
tioned in 1990 that the federal judiciary's "most pressing problems . .. stem
from unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics prosecutions." In numer-
centralization of authority within DOJ"). See generally, Beale, supra note 10, at 374-80 (describing
the inspector general's findings in U.S. attorney firings).
28. For example, Justice Department officials pushed for passage of the Feeney Amendment
to the PROTECT Act, which aimed to restrict judicial departures under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Richman, supra note 25, at 2098-99; see also Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., Remarks for the Charles
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice and Congressional Black Caucus Symposium:
Rethinking Federal Sentencing Policy, 25th Anniversary of the Sentencing Reform Act (June 24,
2009) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-0906241.html)
[hereinafter Holder speech] (observing that the percentage of defendants sentenced within the
guidelines has decreased and that this development should be closely followed).
29. JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITI-
CAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 43-45 (1978); Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional
Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 785 (1999).
30. Beale, supra note 10, 422-24; Richman, supra note 25, at 2094 & nn. 36-37, 2095 &
n.39, 2105; see also Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor-His Temptations, 24 J. Am. JUDI-
CATURE Soc'Y 18, 18 (1940) ("[W]ith his knowledge of local sentiment and opinion, his contact
with and intimate knowledge of the views of the court, and his acquaintance with the feelings of the
group from which jurors are drawn, it is an unsual case in which [the U.S. attorney's] judgment
should be overruled.").
31. Although local juries can check this to some extent through their power to acquit, that
protection is limited by the fact that more than 95 percent of the cases are resolved by plea. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/htmilfjsst/2007/fjs07st.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
32. This is not to say that all federal efforts have been towards centralization at the expense
of U.S. attorneys' offices. Dan Richman has explained the ways in which Congress has either ac-
cepted or supported decentralization at the federal level. See Richman, supra note 29, at 805-10. In
addition, Sara Beale has described other dynamics that help prosecutors in U.S. attorneys' offices
retain discretion and independence from Main Justice. Beale, supra note 10, at 405-09. But despite
some counter-trends that have helped prosecutors retain discretion in local offices, it is accurate to
describe federal criminal prosecution today as, overall, more centralized than in previous decades.
See Stith, supra note 19, at 1440-43.
33. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM. 35 (1990).
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ous year-end reports, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned of the increased bur-
den on the federal courts because of federal criminal law's growth. These
warnings fell on deaf ears in Congress. Far from scaling back federal crimi-
nal law, Congress continued to expand it in the years following the
judiciary's reports."
The Supreme Court then offered its perspective on the issue in 1995.
That year, the Court decided the case of United States v. Lopez, which in-
validated a congressional statute that made it a federal crime to carry a
firearm within one thousand feet of a school. The Court disagreed with the
government's claim that the statute was a proper exercise of the Commerce
Clause power. Five years later, under the same rationale, the Court struck
down a law creatinf a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated
crimes of violence. 8 In both cases, the Court "reject[ed] the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce." In the Court's
view, there was "no better example of the police power, which the Founders
denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppres-
sion of violent crime and vindication of victims."4 These cases were the
Court's effort to remind Congress that it was a body with enumerated and
limited powers and that it could not interfere with local power-and in-
crease the burdens on the federal judiciary-at will. Unlike the judicial
reports, these opinions had the force of law, and they unsettled what had
been a consistently deferential jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause.
34. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The 1998 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary,
reprinted in THIRD BRANCH (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1999, at 2 ("[T]he trend to federalize crimes that
traditionally have been handled in state courts is ... taxing the Judiciary's resources and ... threat-
ens to change entirely the nature of our federal system."); William H. Rehnquist, The 1997 Year-End
Report of the Federal Judiciary, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1998, at 2 ("[Tlhe
Judicial Conference of the United States has raised concerns about legislation pending in Congress
to 'federalize' certain juvenile crimes, maintaining its long-standing position that federal prosecu-
tions should be limited to those offenses that cannot or should not be prosecuted in state courts.");
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice Issues 1992 Year-End Report, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH
(Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1993, at 2-3 (noting the burden on the judiciary from proposed laws expanding
federal jurisdiction); William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH, (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1992, at 3 (noting the increased burden it
would create for the courts if Congress passed the Violence Against Women Act and the Violent
Crime Control Act).
35. Susan A. Ehrlich, The Increasing Federalization of Crime, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 825, 825
(2000).
36. For an argument that the decision in Lopez was designed to stem the tide of criminal
cases flooding federal courts, see Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J.
1641, 1646-54 (2002).
37. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
38. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
39. Id. at 617.
40. Id. at 618.
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Commentators were quick to observe that the Rehnquist Court's approach in
these cases was part of a larger federalism revolution.4 1
Despite the rhetoric, the practical significance of the Court's federalism
cases on criminal law has been negligible. The cases did not stop Congress
from its relentless push to pass new criminal laws.42 Lower courts failed to
follow the Supreme Court's lead, with few of them employing Lopez's anal-
ysis to new contexts.43 The Court itself also put the brakes on any
meaningful limits. It never regulated federal power to intervene with local
criminal authority through the Spending Clause." And the Court has sig-
naled that it will engage in very little additional substantive Commerce
Clause regulation beyond the limited context of Lopez and Morrison.45 The
strongest indicator that the Court was throwing in the towel on policing
Congress's Commerce Clause authority came in 2005, when the Court de-
cided Gonzales v. Raich. In that case, the Court upheld Congress's power
to criminalize possession of marijuana that was neither intended for nor en-
tered the stream of commerce and that was authorized under a state law that
allowed marijuana for medicinal use.47 The Court conceded that the case
was factually distinguishable from Wickard v. Filburn4 -the case that, ac-
41. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REv. 1045 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7
(2001); Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 13 (1995). Justice Souter's dis-
sent in Lopez suggested that the case could become "epochal." 514 U.S. at 615 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). In addition to Lopez and Morrison, the Court's federalism revival also included cases
involving the ability of Congress to commandeer local officials, to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity, and to use its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Richard W. Gamett, The
New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13
(2003).
42. See Brian W. Walsh, Doing Violence to the Law: The Over-federalization of Crime, 20
FED. SENT'G. R. 295, 296 (2008) (noting ninety-one federal crimes were created between 2000 and
2007) (citing John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 26, June 16, 2008, at 1); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the
Explosive Growth of Federal Crime Legislation, 5 ENGAGE MAG., Oct. 2004, at 23, 26 (asserting
there were sixty-seven new federal crimes passed between 1997 and 2003).
43. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Com-
merce Clause Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1253, 1256 (2003);
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the Supreme
Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 369, 370.
44. For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Garnett, supra note 41, at 66-67.
45. The Court has cut back on some of its other federalism decisions as well. See, e.g., Ten-
nessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (affirming Congress's ability to allow money damages
from states for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2003) (upholding a provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act al-
lowing money damages from states for violations). Relatedly, the Court recently upheld the civil
commitment of a mentally and sexually dangerous federal inmate beyond the point at which his
criminal sentence would otherwise terminate under 18 U.S.C. § 4248 as an appropriate use of Con-
gress's authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
1949, 1965 (2010).
46. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
47. Id. at 7-9.
48. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). In Raich, the Court admitted that it was "factually accurate" to note
three differences from Wickard, namely that (1) the Controlled Substances Act at issue in Raich did
not exempt small operations as did the agriculture act at issue in Wickard; (2) "Wickard involved a
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cording to Lopez, offered "perhaps the most far reaching example of Com-
merce Clause authority over intrastate activity" 4 9-and three dissenting
judges made clear their view that Raich was "irreconcilable",o with and
"materially indistinguishable"" from the Court's decisions in Lopez and
52Morrison. Yet a majority of the Court nonetheless accepted the federal
scheme in Raich because it was part of a comprehensive statute addressing
narcotics trafficking, even though the particular conduct at issue involved
purely intrastate conduct with no demonstrated proof that it affected the
broader market. 3 As the dissent characterized it, the decision effectively
made Lopez "nothing more than a drafting guide,"54 because all Congress
needs to do to survive judicial review is to sweep its regulation of intrastate
behavior into a broader regulatory scheme of interstate activity. In the wake
of Raich and other decisions cutting back on the Court's commitment to
federalism, even those who proclaimed the Court's initial efforts a "revolu-
tion" conceded that its time had passed." The Court's federalism revolution
seems to have gone out with a whimper, leaving little room for constitu-
tional regulation of the issue.
But the normative questions of the proper role of the federal government
in criminal law-including the appropriate sweep and enforcement of fed-
eral criminal law, and whether Main Justice should attempt centralized
control over federal prosecutors-remain. And a debate over those issues
continues to rage in policy discussions and legal scholarship.
After describing the current state of the debate in Section I.A, Section
I.B argues for opening a new line of inquiry about the proper allocation of
'quintessential economic activity'-a commercial farm-whereas respondents [in Raich] do not sell
marijuana;" and (3) the record in Wickard demonstrated that wheat production on individual farms,
in the aggregate, did in fact have a "significant impact on market prices:' whereas there was no
record evidence in Raich that the use of medical marijuana affected the overall market. Raich, 545
U.S. at 20.
49. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
50. Raich, 545 U.S. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 45.
52. See id. at 54 ("[I]f the Court today is right about what passes rationality review before us,
then our decision in Morrison should have come out the other way."). In both Lopez and Morrison,
the Court had emphasized that when it had previously "sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity based upon the activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, the activity in question
has been some sort of economic endeavor." United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000)
(citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60).
53. As the principal dissent noted, the majority's decision in Raich "suggests that the federal
regulation of local activity is immune to Commerce Clause challenge because Congress chose to act
with an ambitious, all-encompassing statute, rather than piecemeal." 545 U.S. at 45 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
54. Id. at 46.
55. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 509-10 (2006)
(determining that the "federalism revolution" has either slowed or stopped); see also Erwin Chemer-
insky, The Assumptions of Federalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1763, 1764 (2006) (describing the
"wan[ing]" of the federalism revolution).
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criminal law enforcement power based on the relationship between states
and their localities.
A. Current Methodologies
The expansion of federal criminal law and the Rehnquist Court's at-
tempts to police it have spawned an avalanche of scholarship. Much of the
commentary on federalism is general in nature, without any particular em-
phasis on criminal enforcement in particular. Although the costs and
benefits of federal versus local control are, of course, relevant to the more
specific question of whether responsibility for criminal law should be feder-
alized, the most relevant and informative scholarship for those interested in
identifying the proper scope of federal involvement in criminal law en-
forcement tends to tackle that question head-on. To the extent arguments
from the larger literature are relevant, the specific pieces on criminal law
typically incorporate them and discuss their particular relevance or irrele-
vance to crime.
And there has been no shortage of commentators interested in the spe-
cific question of when the federal government should play a role in criminal
law enforcement and when it should leave matters to local control.
One school of analysis approaches these questions as the Supreme Court
has and is largely interested in what the Constitution has to say about the
relationship among the different institutions. These scholars take what is
essentially a doctrinal approach to the federalism question, analyzing it
much the same way a court would. This line of scholarship therefore looks
at constitutional text, history, and theory to address the question of which
criminal powers are within federal authority and which fall outside it.
Another group of scholars focuses not on the constitutional question of
where power can or must reside, but on the normative question of where
power should reside. A subset of this group tends to focus on arguments
grounded in "the political economy of the different governmental institu-
56. The literature on federalism is far too voluminous to cite fully. For a sampling, see DA-
VID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 118-40 (1995); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
MINN. L. REV. 317 (1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Government,
78 N.YU. L. REV. 144 (2003); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485
(1994); Herbert P. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); Michael
W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987)
(book review).
57. See, e.g., Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 93 (1996) (arguing that the history of federal crim-
inal jurisdiction shows that, among other things, "a rigid dual federalism" has never been
embraced); Brandon L. Bigelow, Note, The Commerce Clause and Criminal Law, 41 B.C. L. REV.
913, 941 (2000) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment should be an external limit on federal criminal
law and that history can be used as a guide in defining the scope of state sovereignty); Thane Rehn,
Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the Scope of Federal Criminal Law,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 2009-15 (2008) (describing scholarship that takes doctrinal and histori-
cal approaches to the federalism question).
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tions" that make up the criminal justice system. These scholars, for exam-
ple, analyze the incentives of officials at the different levels of government
given voter and interest-group demands." They also consider whether a
"race to the top" or a "race to the bottom" might suggest the wisdom of
greater or lesser federal involvement in criminal enforcement.60 Efforts in
this vein also include scholarship that addresses the political and institu-
tional failings of federal law enforcement that may put it at a disadvantage
61
compared to local actors.
Still another major approach to the normative question of federalism in
criminal law focuses on procedural differences between federal and state
systems to decide where best to allocate power.62 Some advocates of federal
law enforcement point to what they see as procedural advantages in federal
court. These include fewer restrictions on the government's use of infor-
mants,56 easier access to wiretaps and warrants,4 less generous discovery
rights for defendants, 6  and broader grand jury powers." The federal jury
pool may also differ from the relevant state jury pool,67 so it is possible that
prosecutors might see an advantage in drawing from the federal pool over a
more localized state jury pool. The federal government's superior witness
protection program has also been cited as a plus." Opponents of increased
federal involvement in matters traditionally left to local prosecutors often
58. Doron Teichman, Decentralizing Crime Control: The Political Economy Perspective, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1749, 1760 (2006).
59. E.g., Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1975-82.
60. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 7, at 1715-23; Gross, supra note 7, at 1727-31; Wayne A.
Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1733, 1744-47
(2006); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 3, at 291; Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice:
Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MiCH. L. REv. 1831, 1840-41
(2005). These scholars follow the jurisdictional competition work pioneered by Charles Tiebout. See
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416 (1956).
61. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 20-22 (emphasizing that federal statutes are
used quite rarely, which means they have little impact on crime rates but present a danger of selec-
tive and arbitrary prosecutions).
62. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1101, 1125 (1995) (arguing that federal
prosecutors should have a role in fighting organized crime, which they define as "group criminality
involving violence," because federal procedure provides particular advantages for those kinds of
cases); Richman, supra note 13, at 397.
63. John Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson point out that one of the main advantages for
bringing organized crime cases in federal court is the ability of federal prosecutors to use uncor-
roborated accomplice testimony. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 62, at 1104.
64. Beale, supra note 3, at 1004.
65. Id.
66. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 62, at 1108.
67. Nancy Gertner, 12 Angry Men (And Women) in Federal Court, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
613, 616, 619 (2007) (explaining that federal jury pools are less diverse than the corresponding state
jury pool because the pool in federal court is "expanded to include the more racially homogenous
suburbs" and pointing out that, in Boston in particular, that has meant that "the vast majority of
juries in federal court .. . did not have a single African-American member").
68. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization
Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 970 (1995).
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look to judicial resources, typically observing that the size and structure of
the federal judiciary is not suited for taking on a larger share of criminal
matters .
Given the richness of the debate and the sheer quantity of articles ad-
dressing the question, it is perhaps hard to believe that anything more can be
added to the vast literature on federalism and crime.
But there is an important omission from the current analysis. To the ex-
tent scholars are seeking to answer the normative question of when power
over criminal enforcement should be centralized or left with local authori-
ties, they have overlooked a valuable source of information. As the next
Section explains, the states have been wrestling with that same basic ques-
tion since their inception, and their experience offers insights into the larger
federalism debate.
B. The Relevance of State Practice
The question of how much control local actors should have over crimi-
nal law enforcement is not unique to federalism and the issue of national
power. Just like the federal government, states, too, must ask when local
prosecutors should retain authority over prosecutions and when a central-
ized, statewide prosecutor should assume responsibility for an area of
criminal law or otherwise intervene in a local action.
There is ample scholarship discussing the relevance of localism (that is,
the relationship between states and their local governments) to questions of
federalism (that is, the relationship between the federal government and the
states and their localities). In both contexts, the values of centralization are
weighed against the virtues of decentralization. Thus, local-government law
scholars have recognized the "natural points of connection" between feder-
alism and localism,o and that the normative questions-and answers-of
localism and federalism therefore often go hand-in-hand. Indeed, as Richard
Briffault has noted, "[T]he 'intellectual case for federalism' often converges
with the case for decentralization, or localism."7' The normative argument
for federalism rests on values such as democratic political participation, in-
creased representation of diverse interests, and innovation-all of which are
also hallmarks of localism.7 2 In fact, local governments are far more poised
than state governments "to provide citizens with opportunities for political
69. See Beale, supra note 3, at 983-91.
70. David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DuKE L.J. 377, 381
(2001); see also Frank S. Alexander, Inherent Tensions Between Home Rule and Regional Planning,
35 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 539, 542 (2000) ("Inherent in both the current federalism debates and the
continuing struggles with home rule ... is the question of at what point an issue is purely local and
when is it a matter for determination by a larger community of interests.").
71. Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994) (quoting McConnell, supra note 56, at
1491).
72. See id. at 1305, 1315 ("These virtues of federalism-participation, diversity, intergov-
ernmental competition, political responsiveness, and innovation-are, of course, among the very
values regularly associated with local autonomy.").
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participation, to reflect diversity, to increase the likelihood of innovation and
experimentation, and to engage in the kind of competition that constrains
governmental behavior."" Thus, when states consider whether to defer to
local governments, they are wrestling with the very same questions that the
federal government considers when it decides whether to defer to states. At
the heart of both is a debate over the merits of decentralization.74
Federalism scholars, too, have highlighted that federalism questions of-
ten are-or should be-about localism as much as they are about state
power.7 ' This is true of federalism's critics and proponents alike. Supporters
such as Michael McConnell and Deborah Jones Merritt, for example, ex-
plicitly praise federalism for the fact that it respects local autonomy and the
interests of communities. Critics like Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley are
critical of federalism doctrine because it focuses on the federal-state rela-
tionship when, in their view, any benefits of federalism would come from
preserving the autonomy of local governments.
Even the Court has emphasized the value of local authority instead of
speaking exclusively about state sovereignty when discussing federalism.
For example, the Court in Lopez worried about an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause that would "'effectually obliterate the distinction
73. Id. at 1348.
74. For a discussion of the relationship between centralized and decentralized units of gov-
ernment that shows the parallels between the relationship between state and local entities and the
federal government and the states, see Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized
Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1359-60 (1997).
75. Briffault, supra note 71, at 1311-12 (noting that scholars and judges have rested the case
for federalism on arguments about political decentralization); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
"Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 429, 441
(2002) ("[Iln functional analysis of the values that federalism serves, the significance of local gov-
ernments is enormous.").
76. E.g., McConnell, supra note 56, at 1511 (arguing that the case for federalism is an "ar-
gument for substantial state and local autonomy" and for the "devolution of governing authority to
state, city, and community levels") (emphasis added); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 5 n.20 (1988) ("The
benefits produced by local governments ... may be counted among the benefits of maintaining
independent state governments."); id at 7 ("[A] major advantage of federalism lies in the ability of
state and local governments to draw citizens into the political process [through the] greater accessi-
bility and smaller scale of local government."); see also Ehrlich, supra note 35, at 837 (noting the
values of federalism include "the closeness of government bodies to their constituents [and] the
preservation of the ability of local and state governments to experiment in social policy"); Thomas
M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary
from the Federalization of State Crime, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 503, 508, 516 (1995) (observing that
neither the Constitution nor debates among the Framers suggest "that the federal government was to
have a significant role in prosecuting crimes affecting the local community" and that there are sound
policy reasons for a limited federal role, including the fact that "most crime is local in nature, and
consequently, the local community feels the brunt of the offense").
77. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 919-20 (1994). Rubin and Feeley go on to argue that protecting states actu-
ally harms local political participation, but as Rick Hills persuasively argues, the evidence for this
claim is lacking. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for
Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187 (2005).
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between what is national and what is local and create a completely central-
ized government.' "7
Although fundamental normative questions of federalism and localism
are the same, no one has bothered to look to see how the states have an-
swered them in the context of criminal law. Perhaps one reason the
connection between federalism and localism is missed in this area is be-
cause discussions of federalism in this context, particularly at the Supreme
Court, more often revolve around the rhetoric of sovereignty. In terms of
constitutional doctrine, this makes sense because states are explicitly pro-
tected in the Constitution as sovereigns, whereas local communities are not.
On the contrary, the Court has emphasized that localities are nothing more
than "political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for
exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted
to them.",o It is therefore no surprise that the Court typically addresses fed-
eralism issues as questions of state versus national power without much
attention to how power is then allocated within a state.
But if one is interested in the question of power allocation as a norma-
tive question of institutional design and not about constitutional
interpretation, the parallels between federalism and localism cannot be ig-
nored." Both turn on striking the right balance between centralization and
local control.
Certainly the questions of how much to protect local control and how
much to centralize are at the heart of governmental decision making about
prosecutorial power.82 State legislatures, like Congress, must decide when to
strip localities of authority over crime or provide concurrent authority in a
78. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)); see also id. at 567-68 (worrying about an interpretation of the
Commerce Clause under which "there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local").
79. E.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 ("[I]n areas such as criminal law enforcement ... States
historically have been sovereign."); see also Briffault, supra note 71, at 1328 ("The Court has been
more attentive to the formal differences between states and local government than the scholarly
advocates of federalism, much as the Court has continued to employ the rhetoric of state sovereignty
80. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); see also Williams v. Mayor of
Bait., 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) ("A municipal corporation, created by a state for the better ordering of
government, has no privileges or immunities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in
opposition to the will of its creator."); City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923)
("[Miunicipalities have no inherent right of self government which is beyond the legislative control
of the State.").
81. Despite recognizing the parallels between normative questions of localism and federal-
ism, Richard Briffault has argued that courts should avoid analyzing these normative values in
reviewing congressional actions because those are "essentially political decisions [that] ought to
have occurred in the political arena." Briffault, supra note 71, at 1350. This Article takes no position
on how courts should assess federalism claims in criminal law, but instead argues that the "essen-
tially political decisions" made by state political actors weighing the values of decentralization
should inform the same political decisions made by federal political actors.
82. Barron, supra note 70, at 381.
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state-level actor." The position of a state attorney general ("AG") was cre-
ated in some states in response to a concern with "sectionalism" and a desire
"to protect public rights and redress public injuries throughout the entire
state, independent of the attitude of local authorities who might be indiffer-
ent, incapable, or even antagonistic."84 What authority states give to
attorneys general is therefore quite telling because that authority reflects the
state legislative judgment of when the need for centralization outweighs
claims of localism. Similarly, when state-level prosecutors are given discre-
tion to intervene in local matters, they must decide, like their federal-level
counterparts, whether to exercise it or whether their involvement would in-
terfere too greatly in local matters. And a centralized state-level prosecutor
with supervisory powers over local prosecutors must, like Main Justice, de-
termine how much control it wants to keep at the central level instead of
letting local actors respond to local concerns.
To be sure, there are important differences between the states and the
federal government in terms of their relationship with local actors. State
legislatures have greater control over local authorities than Congress has
over state or local authorities. State legislatures pass the criminal laws that
local prosecutors must enforce; Congress, in contrast, cannot insist that local
prosecutors enforce federal laws." In addition, it is difficult for the president
and the Department of Justice to take credit for addressing crime without
federal prosecutions. In contrast, the state AG is generally perceived as the
chief law enforcement officer of the state. That means the state AG can
claim credit for local prosecutions even if she did not bring the cases herself.
Similarly, if crime rates fall, the state AG can again campaign on that fact,
even if she formally lacked jurisdiction over the main index crimes. The
public perception is what counts, and the state AG's position puts her in a
better position to get credit for reductions in crime and government wins in
big cases without necessarily having to prosecute those cases herself.
These differences must be kept in mind, but they do not render the state
experience with local actors irrelevant. On the contrary, in many ways the
differences between the states and the federal government make the internal
state relationships between state and local actors an even more valuable
frame of reference for federalism questions. Most of the ways in which
83. Various government reformers, for example, have put pressure on states over the years to
employ more centralized control over prosecutorial power. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAw OBSER-
VANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 11-14 (1931) (citing decentralization as a
reason that criminal justice in the states is "ineffective"); Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal
Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 433 (1960) (explaining that effective law enforcement
and protection of individual rights are hampered in part by the lack of centralized control over the
separate principalities of local prosecutors); Earl H. De Long & Newman F. Baker, The Prosecuting
Attorney: Provisions of Law Organizing the Office, 23 J. AM. INsT. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 926,
963 (1933); Note, The Common Law Power of State Attorneys-General to Supersede Local Prosecu-
tors, 60 YALE L.J. 559, 559 n.2 (1951) (citing sources).
84. State v. Bowles, 79 P. 726, 728 (Kan. 1905).
85. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Although Congress may use its spending
power to achieve similar results, the realities of federal grants might make it hard to get the money
directly to the relevant local actors.
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federal and state practice differ revolve around the greater ability, willing-
ness, and incentive of the federal government to make symbolic gestures
with crime legislation and targeted enforcement in high-profile or select
matters.
Consider first the differences between federal and state prosecutors.
Federal prosecutors focus on the cases they bring, not on the ones they do
not. Because primary law enforcement responsibility rests with the states,
state prosecutors are blamed for underenforcement, not federal prosecutors.
Similarly, federal prosecutors do not concern themselves as much with how
their selection of cases affects a community. They do not have an obligation
to fix local problems, and they are not directly accountable to those commu-
nities. The federal government's enforcement decisions therefore largely
ignore the day-to-day realities of local communities.
The relationship between state and local prosecutors, in contrast, has a
much firmer grounding in practical concerns. Even though the state AG
may not be directly responsible for local crimes under state law-indeed,
the state AG may lack authority to address them directly-the public per-
ceives the state AG as sharing responsibility for local problems. Because
state AGs are going to be held responsible for local conditions to some ex-
tent, they therefore have an incentive to fix any problems on the ground .
Thus, how state AGs go about addressing local crime can be quite informa-
tive for those seeking to understand what type of intervention might be most
effective. Unlike federal prosecutors who can, to a larger extent, get by on
symbolic gestures, state-level prosecutors are going to have a greater incen-
tive to make sure things are actually working well. Put another way, to the
extent there is divergence in state and federal approaches to the issues of
when and how a centralized actor should intervene in criminal law enforce-
ment, it is often because state-level actors are weighing more of the relevant
18
variables than the federal actors are.
The differences between the respective legislatures-Congress and state
legislatures-also offer a valuable basis for comparison. Congress and state
86. As Stephen Schulhofer and Ilene Nagel observed in their landmark study of federal plea
bargaining under the Sentencing Guidelines:
All the players at the local level (prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation officers, and trial
court judges) deal with cases on an individual, "micro" level. Both the offense and the offender
are highly specific and contextualized. In contrast, the key players at the national level (Con-
gress, the Commission, the Department of Justice, and the appellate courts) deal with
sentencing policy at the "macro" level, thinking about appropriate treatment for broad, aggre-
gated categories.
Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV.
1284, 1298 (1997).
87. Email from James Tierney, Dir., Nat'l State Attorneys Gen. Program, Columbia Law
Sch., to Rachel Barkow (Mar. 6, 2010, 18:22) (on file with author).
88. How prosecutors choose to exercise delegated power is an important locus of the federal-
ism debate. See Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 62, at 1101 ("[T]he right place to locate a debate
about the federalization of crime is not the text of federal statutes, whether enacted or proposed, but
the resources and priorities of federal prosecutors.").
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legislatures are generally making different decisions about their respective
jurisdiction's involvement in criminal law enforcement and its relationship
to local communities. A key decision for Congress is whether or not to cre-
ate a federal crime at all. After making that decision, Congress also has to
decide whether to place exclusive or concurrent authority with the federal
prosecutor. Exclusive authority would require the federal government to
make a significant investment in law enforcement resources, to assume ex-
clusive responsibility for an area of law (and take the blame if crime rates in
that area go up), and it would raise political questions about interfering with
the states' police power. Thus, Congress overwhelmingly opts for concurrent
jurisdiction in areas of traditionally local concern. In those areas, federal law
leaves it up to the discretion of federal prosecutors whether to get involved. 9
So, for Congress, the main issue is whether a federal statute is needed to
address an issue that overlaps with local control and, if so, what its terms
should be.
State legislatures, in contrast, do not primarily affect local authority by
deciding whether to create a state crime. Most criminal laws that local pros-
ecutors enforce, and every serious offense they enforce, are state crimes.9
Differences between state and local prosecutions are therefore not based on
the source of law being enforced. If state legislators wish to affect the state-
local relationship, they must instead directly confront the question of wheth-
er to let local prosecutors enforce state laws exclusively or whether to give a
state-level prosecutor concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction. Most states face
no constitutional limitations on their ability to allocate power to state-level,
as opposed to local-level, prosecutors.9' States, like the federal government,
face the same issues in terms of deciding between exclusive and concurrent
jurisdiction. Exclusive jurisdiction would mean states would have to expand
their law enforcement budgets and resources, which would similarly raise
political issues with local jurisdictions to the extent the areas were viewed
as traditionally local matters. As a consequence, like the federal govern-
ment, states tend to opt for concurrent jurisdiction when state-level actors
are given authority at all, except for some limited areas of specialized regu-
latory crimes.
89. See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 68, at 973 (observing that Congress passes new laws
with the expectation that federal prosecutors will exercise their discretion about when to intervene in
areas where states have concurrent jurisdiction).
Although some commentators have raised the possibility of enforcing federal laws in state
courts to address concerns about strained federal judicial resources, Beale, supra note 3, at 1010-14,
the Supreme Court's decision in Printz forecloses any option that would mandate state prosecutors
to bring those actions.
90. 6 EUGENE MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 23.6 (3d ed. 2007);
see Briffault, supra note 71, at 1343 ("[Elven under the most generous definitions of home rule,
local governments lack power. . . to define and punish serious crimes."). For a discussion of the
scope of local criminal laws, see, for example, Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal law of Mu-
nicipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1423-35 (2001).
91. Barron, supra note 70, at 392 ("There are few, if any, matters of concern to state resi-
dents that, as a formal legal matter, the state legislature would be barred from addressing because of
the need to respect the rights to self-government of local communities.").
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It is important to note that, at the state level, a preference for local en-
forcement 92 is a conscious choice, 3 not a dictate of state constitutional law.9
Thus, because the question for state legislators is an explicit question of in-
stitutional allocation and they typically have freedom to make that decision
however they think best, it is more likely that state legislators will focus on
the institutional advantages and disadvantages of each actor than federal
legislators will. That makes the state experience all the more informative for
those interested in striking the right balance between federal and local allo-
cation of power because the framework in the states is more likely to have
been developed with direct attention to the question of enforcement alloca-
tion.
In addition, to the extent the question is whether to give a centralized ac-
tor the discretion to intervene with concurrent jurisdiction, states are still
facing a somewhat different set of enforcement choices than the federal
government because state-level prosecutors are more independent than their
federal counterparts. Whereas the attorney general of the United States is
appointed and removable by the president and serves his law enforcement
agenda,5 almost all state attorneys general are separately elected from the
governor and may not even be a member of the same party as the governor.
Thus, while Congress has to decide whether it trusts giving the president's
appointee control over a criminal justice issue rather than letting that issue
remain within state control, state legislatures typically must decide which of
two independently elected prosecutors it would prefer to enforce existing
92. See infra Part M.
93. Barron, supra note 70, at 390-91 ("[Sitate legislatures possess the formal legal power to
delegate large swaths of authority to their local governments or to withhold such powers from them
as the legislatures choose.").
94. Even when localities enjoy state constitutional grants of authority, that power is often
subject to revision by the state or is easily overruled. See Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors
Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542,
2558 (2006) ("[Aluthority that cities exercise is almost always ... subject to revision [and]...
[sitate legislatures have been aggressive in overruling local decisions with which they do not
agree.").
95. The attorney general also has a duty to uphold the rule of law, regardless of the presi-
dent's agenda. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIEs 2-4 (1992); Green & Zacharias, supra
note 27, at 191-92.
96. The governor appoints the attorney general in five states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, and Wyoming. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State
Attorneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REv. POL. 525, 530 (1994); see infra Part H1. The
attorney general is a member of the governor's cabinet in Florida, Michigan, and Arizona, but is
independently elected. The attorney general and governor of these states are not required to be on
the same ticket or even be members of the same party, creating inevitable conflicts which have led
scholars to debate the efficacy of these plural executives. Compare Michael Hoover, Turn Your Ra-
dio On: Brailey Odham's 1952 "Talkathon" Campaign for Florida Governor, 66 THE HISTORIAN
701, 706 n. 19 (2004) ("[Florida's] plural executive system is considered a weak form of government
because . . . [tIhe governor must depend on the will of a potentially independent cabinet to adminis-
ter effectively."), with Daniel Webster & Donald L. Bell, First Principles for Constitution Revision,
22 NOVA L. REv. 391, 417-18 (1997) (noting that a cabinet of independently elected officers who
may be political opponents has vexed many governors, but "provides some worthwhile protection
for the people").
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state laws: locally elected prosecutors or a prosecutor chosen in a statewide
election.
Consider first Congress's choice about whether to delegate to a federal
prosecutor. As a general matter, Congress is more likely to delegate power
to an executive agency or official when the same political party controls the
executive and the legislature. 7 Under this traditional view, one might think
Congress would prefer to leave matters with the states and local prosecutors
if the alternative would be passing a law that would end up being enforced
by a presidential appointee of a different party. But this general framework
for thinking about delegation is inapplicable to questions of criminal law.
Members of Congress have little to gain from leaving things as they are-
that is, with states and localities. In contrast, legislators typically benefit
politically when they enact or expand federal criminal laws.98 As Bill Stuntz
has persuasively explained, the politics of criminal law are less about party
affiliation because both parties share the same incentive to appear as tough
as possible.99 Thus, any delegation is a good delegation from Congress's
perspective, because it benefits from the symbolic act of passing the law. As
the past three decades prove, Congress is thus nearly always willing to ac-
cede to an executive request for a new, more expansive, or more punitive
criminal law, regardless of whether the president is in the same party as the
governing coalition in the legislature and no matter what the politics in the
states. If the executive then exercises its discretion in an unpopular manner,
the blame falls squarely on it, not the legislature.'m
The focus of blame on the executive branch holds true in criminal law in
a way it does not in other regulatory contexts because the enforcer is rightly
seen as the key decision maker. In other regulatory areas, Congress's role is
more important than it is in criminal law because there are interest groups
on both sides arguing about the substantive content of the law itself. In addi-
tion, whereas criminal procedure is dominated by constitutional rules,
administrative procedure is largely a creature of legislative action. As a re-
sult, Congress can give regulated entities a greater or lesser role in how the
agency shapes its policies.'o' Again, that makes Congress a greater source of
interest group attention in other contexts than in criminal law. In criminal
law, the key decision maker is in the executive branch or, in the case of con-
stitutional procedures, the courts. Thus, from Congress's perspective, the
politics are always in favor of more criminal law, no matter what party holds
97. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O'HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 131-33, 154-55 (1999).
98. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 727-30 (2005).
99. Stuntz, supra note 11, at 529-33.
100. Id. at 548-50 ("[Pjublic displeasure toward overaggressive prosecution is more likely to
be visited on the prosecutorial agent than on the legislative principal.").
101. See Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process.
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REv. 431, 443-44 (1989); McNollgast, Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An
Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 307, 312
(1990).
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the White House, because it reaps only benefits from such a decision and
does not pay a price.
Now consider the politics of the state allocation decision. State legisla-
tures, like Congress, have the same political incentives to create new and
expansive crimes and increase penalties. But, unlike Congress, which has
only federal prosecutors as a relevant enforcement option if it wants federal
involvement at all, state legislatures have the choice of which actor within a
state to give enforcement power. In most states, both the attorney general
and local prosecutors are elected.o2 State legislatures thus cannot control
either option with appointment or removal, nor, for that matter, can the gov-
ernor in most places. o3 Although the party affiliation of the state attorney
general might give a legislature more or less control over general enforce-
ment policy--or, if not control, at least some level of predictability-it is
unclear whether party affiliation will end up making much of a difference.
For starters, as noted, both parties tend to coalesce on criminal justice policy
far more than they differ. Second, the choice is not a binary one between a
single statewide prosecutor and a single local prosecutor. Rather, there are
numerous local prosecutors in a state, each typically independently elected
by his or her community. Thus, some local prosecutors will share the party
affiliation of the state legislature and some will not. It is unclear how legisla-
tures weigh that mix against a state attorney general's party affiliation.
Certainly some state legislative representatives will push for local control in
their district.'O' Third, the state attorney general is less likely to be a puppet
of party sentiment than a controller of it, because the attorney general is
often a leader in state party politics and an aspirant for even higher office. 05
Finally, because the enforcement allocation decision tends to long outlast a
prosecutor's term in office-because shifting policy as actors change with
elections would create too much destabilization-it is less likely that legis-
lators will make the decision based on the party affiliation of those in office
at the time, unless those affiliations are relatively stable over time.
102. STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS, 2005 11 (2006) (data showing local prosecutors are elected in 47 states; 3 excep-
tions are Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey); Clayton, supra note 96, at 530 (noting that the
attorney general is elected in 43 states).
103. In the few states that look like the federal model, the allocation of power between local
and statewide prosecutors does not differ from the allocation of power in those states where the AG
is elected separately or not a member of the governor's cabinet. See infra Part II.
104. Hills, supra note 77, at 213 ("[S]tate legislatures in the United States generally function
as assemblies of ambassadors from the different local jurisdictions within the state [making them
likely to] defer to each legislator on local matters within their own district.").
105. Clayton, supra note 96, at 530 ("The office's election and tenure provides the attorney
general autonomy to represent whatever positions he or she believes are in the public interest or are
required by law, regardless of the preferences of the state's governor or legislature."); Colin L. Pro-
vost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism,
PUBLIUS, Spring 2003, at 37, 40 ("[O]f the 166 attorneys general who served at least two years
between 1980 and 1999, more than 70 ran for a governorship or a U.S. Senate seat [and] [a]nother
20 ran for or were appointed to a lower court seat, a federal agency post, or another position in state
government.").
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All this suggests that the allocation decision for state legislatures is less
likely to turn on the ability of the legislature to control the prosecutor than
on other concerns. Fiscal concerns are likely at the top that list, which is
another way in which state and federal politics differ. The states have more
limited budgets than the federal government. This means that states may be
more likely to cede control over criminal law enforcement to local prosecu-
tors to keep those prosecutions funded by a local as opposed to statewide tax
base."0 The federal government may be comparatively more willing to foot
the bill for federal prosecutors from the federal tax base because it is not
responsible for the enforcement of most criminal laws, as the states are, and
because prosecution expenses are such a small part of the federal budget.' 7o
From a comparative standpoint, scarcity alone does not dictate that deci-
sions will be better or worse than those made with abundant resources, so
the fact that states may seek to save money does not by itself make their
decisions substantively better or worse than those made by a federal gov-
ernment with more resources.
But there are independent reasons to believe that state budget constraints
are more conducive to rational decision making than decisions made in the
shadow of the federal budget. As I have explained at greater length else-
where, focusing on the costs as well as the benefits of criminal justice
policies improves decision making because it allows the state to compare
alternatives rationally, with an eye toward maximizing the social benefit
from the money spent. 1s In addition, focusing on costs as part of a cost-
benefit analysis can help check various cognitive biases that the public and
politicians may share about criminal justice policy, including a tendency to
overestimate the frequency and intensity of particular types of violent
crimes and a preference for short-term solutions, like incarceration, that may
not always yield the most effective long-term results.'" In the current politi-
cal climate, "[t]here is only one reason for legislatures to hesitate to pass
[ever harsher and broader criminal laws]: cost."o Considering the costs of
enforcement and punitive strategies as well as their benefits can thus serve a
valuable disciplining function, improve deliberation, and help increase the
likelihood that the state adopts a course that will yield the greatest enforce-
ment benefits."' To the extent that cost decisions are driving state allocation
decisions, then, those decisions may prove to be highly informative.
106. Barron, supra note 70, at 393-94 (explaining that local taxing authority is one reason for
local power). Most local prosecutors receive the bulk of their funding from local sources. Perry,
supra note 102, at 4 ("[H]alf of all [local prosecutors'] offices received at least 82% of their funds
for prosecutorial functions from the county government ... [and] [albout 32% of offices relied
exclusively on the county for their budget.").
107. Barkow, supra note 8, at 1301.
108. See id. at 1291-92.
109. See id. at 1293-94.
110. William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule
of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIEs 351, 377 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
Ill. See Barkow, supra note 8, at 1294-97.
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Moreover, state governments must pay the prison costs for all defen-
dants, regardless of whether those defendants are prosecuted by a local
prosecutor or a state appointee."12 So, even if states save money in prosecu-
tion and policing costs by giving prosecution power to localities, they have
to weigh that savings against the fact that they lose direct control over prison
costs."3 Because prison costs are a significant portion of state budgets,1 4
states have incentives to make sure that those prison resources are being
used effectively. In turn, that means that states should pay some attention to
whether local or state officials are superior at prioritizing crimes. If states
are uniformly deciding that local actors are better suited to make those
judgment calls, that lends support to the idea that whatever benefits are had
by centralization, they are not worth the corresponding costs. If, in contrast,
states are deciding that centralization is appropriate, that, too is likely to be
based on a weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of centralized ver-
sus local authority. Either way, the state approach offers a valuable
perspective that can inform the federalism question in a way that is currently
missing from the existing debate, because Congress is unlikely to be seri-
ously addressing any of these issues.
In addition, it is important to remember what federal legislators are de-
ciding to do with their larger budgets. They are not creating federal
prosecutors' offices that are anywhere near large enough to enforce ade-
quately all existing federal laws-including laws dealing with common
offenses like theft, fraud, robbery, narcotics trafficking, and weapons pos-
session and use." 5 And Congress is certainly not funding a full-scale federal
police force. On the contrary, the scheme established at the federal level is,
relatively speaking, sparse."'6 There are over six times as many state and
112. Because most states leave prosecutorial power with local communities, "local prosecu-
tors effectively dictate the level of spending that the state legislature must maintain." Misner, supra
note 6, at 720.
113. JOSEPH DILLON DAVEY, THE POLITICS OF PRISON EXPANSION 83 (1998) ("[Liocally
elected prosecutors .. . have little or no concern about how [state] prisons are funded.").
114. Spending on corrections has increased at a faster rate than spending in any other area,
including other law enforcement costs such as police and courts. Barkow, supra note 8, at 1287 &
n.49; Misner, supra note 6, at 726.
115. There are approximately 5,300 prosecutors in the U.S. attorneys' offices around the
country to police those 4,000-plus criminal laws. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OF UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' OFFICES: AUDIT REPORT 09-03
1 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/EOUSA/a0903/final.pdf. To give a sense of
perspective, New York City alone has 1,727 prosecutors. Richman, supra note 25, at 2088. A single
federal law like the Hobbs Act covers by its terms just about any holdup of a business, so Congress
hardly expects full enforcement but rather highly selective decisions by federal prosecutors. Gore-
lick & Litman, supra note 68, at 973.
116. In fiscal year 2003, the federal government spent approximately $20 million on police
protection, as compared to $11 million by the states and nearly $58 million by local governments.
KRISTEN A. HUGHES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE
AND EMPLOYMENT iN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/contentl
pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf. In this respect, then, Congress and state legislatures are similar. Neither is
taking on broad-scale enforcement responsibility. See Schragger, supra note 94, at 2563-64 ("State
and federal officials intervene fairly regularly in local affairs but rarely to take on the baseline social
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local police employees as federal. ' And local prosecutors outnumber fed-
eral prosecutors by a five-to-one ratio."' As a result, the best federal
prosecutors can do-and all Congress can reasonably expect them to do-is
cherry-pick cases that would otherwise go to local enforcement without ever
hoping to cover anything close to all or even a significant proportion of
those cases covered by federal law. 9
States could adopt a similar scheme to the federal one in terms of having
a central authority selectively target only certain cases. Indeed, in most
states, they could do it right now with the existing personnel in attorney
general offices, because it is a regime that is heavier on symbolic-message
cases than it is on practical, large-scale enforcement. Thus, states could pro-
vide that state-level prosecutors could bring actions under any state law at
their discretion and trust state prosecutors to choose when to do that given
existing resources. States often have highly sophisticated investigative bu-
reaus within their AG offices,' 20 so those investigators could provide state-
level prosecutors with support similar to that provided to federal prosecutors
by the FBI. Thus, whether or not states opt to follow the federal model can
offer some indication of its wisdom. If states are choosing to spend their law
enforcement funds elsewhere, that, too, is valuable comparative data for
thinking about the federal system because states have the capacity for this
same scheme.
In sum, because states face the same basic questions about local control
over crime as the federal government and have greater incentives to maxi-
mize the use of their crime-fighting resources, looking at state practice
offers a valuable comparative perspective for analyzing questions of federal-
ism.121 In addition, to the extent state legislatures and Congress face different
issues because of different institutional options or political dynamics, it is
possible to evaluate those dynamics to determine whether, in an ideal world,
we would want those to be the driving factors of the institutional allocation
decision or whether, in fact, we would prefer to have the decision made on
other grounds reaching different conclusions. Either way, there is a wealth
of information to be had by looking at the states.
welfare responsibilities of tax-base-dependent local governments."); Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2014
(noting that local governments pay 90 percent of the costs of local policing).
117. HUGHES, supra note 116, at tbl.5 (noting 156,607 federal police protection employees,
compared to 105,933 employed by state governments and 856,396 by localities). Id. at tbl.3.
118. Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2028.
119. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 18 ("[tIn practice federal law enforcement can only reach
a small percent [of violent crime]."); Gorelick & Litman, supra note 68, at 976 ("It is Congress's
expectation that only a tiny fraction of the conduct falling under such statutes will be prosecuted
federally,"); Richman, supra note 25, at 2089-90 ("[The federal system] has long been characterized
by extraordinarily broad substantive statutes enforced by a relatively small bureaucracy that can pick
and choose among possible targets.").
120. NAT'L Ass'N ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSI-
BILITIEs 307-08 (Emily Myers & Lynne Ross eds., 2d ed. 2007). Some states give the attorney
general supervisory authority over the state police as well. Id. at 306-07.
121. See Barron, supra note 70, at 381.
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I. THE ALLOCATION OF LAw ENFORCEMENT WITHIN THE STATES
Because state practice can offer insights into the question of when federal
law enforcement is appropriate, this Part looks at how the states divide re-
sponsibility between state and local prosecutors. Section II.A begins with a
discussion of the methodology used to obtain intrastate allocation informa-
tion. Section II.B then describes the dominant approach in most states of
deferring to local actors. Section II.C provides a description of the few states
that take an alternative view of a statewide prosecutor's function.
A. Methodology
Before turning to the substance of the findings, a description of the meth-
odology is in order. Researching criminal law enforcement authority in all the
states poses many problems. First, criminal law enforcement responsibility is
often scattered across state codes, not limited to a section devoted to criminal
law. Second, even if one accurately catalogs all the criminal laws on the books
that describe which actor has the power to bring criminal charges, statutory
law may not accurately reflect the law in practice because some laws are sim-
ply not enforced. Third, many state laws vest what appears to be broad
residual authority in state attorneys general to prosecute crimes, either at the
request of the governor or at the attorney general's discretion. But the only
way to know how these laws operate in practice is to talk to the people who
administer them.
The goal, then, is to make the survey of state practice as complete as pos-
sible without devoting so many years to the effort that information becomes
out of date before it can be put to paper. In that vein, the research methodol-
ogy here followed this basic framework: The first step was to look at state
constitutions and codes for the stated criminal jurisdiction of attorneys gen-
eral. Second, for those states with laws that were unclear in any respect about
the allocation of responsibility between attorneys general and local prosecu-
tors, the state's caselaw was consulted to determine if the judiciary resolved
the issue. Third, each state attorney general's website was reviewed to deter-
mine how the office itself characterized its authority. Fourth, and finally, in
any state where the attorney general's power was discretionary in any respect
or where the law was otherwise uncertain, interviews were conducted with
representatives from each AG's office to find out more about how the AG has
exercised that authority. Relevant information was gathered for the first three
steps from all 50 states. In states that delegate all authority to the attorney
general, steps one through three produced a full accounting of state practice.12
In the remaining 47 states, some follow-up was necessary for clarification or
to confirm what appeared to be the practice from the written materials. Of
those states, 37 responded to requests for clarification or confirmation. Ten
states did not respond to telephone requests for information about how author-
122. Those states were Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island.
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ity was exercised in practice,'23 but in 5 of those states, the practice seems rea-
sonably clear from the material obtained through the first three steps;
interviews in those states were sought only to confirm, not to clarify, what
appears to be the state practice.' 24 Moreover, given the consistency in the 40
states where full information is available, it is reasonable to assume that the
states with missing interview data follow that same general pattern, particu-
larly because the statutes, caselaw, and public relations information from
those states all point in the same direction as the vast majority of states where
interviews were obtained.
Piecing together these sources thus creates a well-informed general im-
pression of state- versus local-level jurisdiction within a state, even if some
individual cases or narrow categories of criminal law enforcement are over-
looked or if survey data from a handful of states is absent.
B. The Consensus in the States
What stands out most in looking at state practice is the remarkable degree
of uniformity. In almost every state, a conscious choice has been made to de-
fer to local prosecutors. States have centralized authority in a statewide
prosecutor in a handful of areas, and there is remarkable overlap among the
states in terms of the content of those areas. But outside these contexts, local
prosecutors are responsible for the vast bulk of criminal law enforcement
within a state. And these local prosecutors are operating in most states with
little centralized supervision by a state-level actor.125
1. The Limited Jurisdiction of State-Level Prosecutors
Most states vest state-level prosecutors-typically the attorney
general-with exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over just a handful of areas
that repeat themselves in state after state. This Section provides an overview
126
of those crimes that are often handled by state-level prosecutors.
123. The states that did not return calls for additional information were Maryland, Michigan,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
124. The written materials from New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wis-
consin are quite specific about how the practice works in those states. For example, in Texas,
according to a state case from 1996, "the attorney general has no authority to initiate criminal prose-
cutions." Lone Starr Multi Theatres, Inc. v. Texas, 922 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). The
New Mexico AG's website explains that "[pirimary jurisdiction for the majority of crimes lies with
the local District Attorney" and that only "[o]n occasion" does a DA send a case to the AG's office.
Prosecutions FAQ, OFF. N.M. ATr'v GEN., http://www.nmag.gov/office/Divisions/Pros/faq.aspx#
(last visited Sept. 1, 2010). Thus, while confirmation through an interview with someone familiar
with the practice on the ground would have been helpful, the written materials that are available
provide a fairly vivid picture of how things are working.
125. Criminal law thus mirrors what one sees in general across subjects: states are "far more
likely to devolve power to elected local officials" than the federal government is. Hills, supra note
77, at 210, 213.
126. This is not exclusive, of course. Some states give their state-level prosecutors additional
jurisdiction in isolated areas. In Arizona, for example, the attorney general has the authority to pros-
ecute and enforce transportation code violations and fraud in Indian crafts. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
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a. Public Corruption and Election Fraud
States uniformly view public corruption, including local corruption, as
an area that demands attention from a state-level officer to avoid both ac-
tual and perceived conflicts of interest.127 States also frequently give state-
level prosecutors authority over the related areas of voter and election
fraud. Just as public corruption has statewide ramifications and is often
poorly prosecuted at the local level, voter and election fraud also present
distinctly statewide concerns.
b. Benefits Fraud
State-level prosecutors handle federal benefits fraud claims in forty-
nine states.129 Uniformity in this context is prompted by federal law, which
§§ 28-333, 28-5923(B), 44-1231.03(A) (2002). Hawaii's attorney general can bring criminal actions
when there is an artificial shortage of petroleum products. HAW. REV. STAT. § 486H-17 (2008). The
Illinois attorney general may be requested to initiate criminal prosecutions for violations of the
Illinois Archaeological and Paleontological Resources Protection Act. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
3435/3.1 (2008). The Missouri attorney general is authorized to prosecute criminal gambling
violations. Mo. REV. STAT. § 313.830.7 (2000). New Jersey allows the attorney general to initiate
terrorism prosecutions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-2(e) (West 2001), as does South Carolina, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-7-1630(A)(6), -1630(B) (2009). The goal here is not to create a comprehensive
catalog, but to document the common areas seen across vast numbers of states.
127. In state attorney general offices, public corruption units or other mechanisms for vesting
control over local corruption are common. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 200-A (2009);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 223 (2001); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-205(a)(1) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-7-1630(A)(3) (1976); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-1-605 (2010); William H. Pryor, Jr., A Report from
the State's Law Firm, 62 ALA. LAW. 264, 267 (2001); Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with
Jon Fussner, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., Or. (June 11, 2009); Telephone Interview with Stan
Alexander, Assistant Attorney Gen., Miss. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 18, 2009); About the Office,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE Arr'Y GEN. MASS., http://www.mass.gov/?pagelD-cagohomepage&L-1 &LO-
Home&sid-Cago (follow "About the Office" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); About the Public
Integrity Bureau, N.Y. OFF. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.ag.ny.gov (follow "Our Office" hyperlink; then
follow "Public Integrity Bureau" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); AG-Crime & Victims, OFF.
Arr'Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164-17334_18113---,00.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2010); Attorney General's Public Integrity Unit, OFF. NEv. ATr'Y GEN., http://ag.state.nv.us/
integrity/integrity.htm; Criminal, ARIZ. ATT'Y GEN. TERRY GODDARD, http://www.azag.gov/
Criminal (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); Criminal Division, OF'. LA. Arr'Y GEN. http://www.
ag.state.1a.us/Article.aspxarticlelD--6&catlD-0# (last visited Oct. 9, 2010); Protecting Public
Integrity, ST. CONN. DIVISION CRIM. JUST., http://www.ct.gov/csao/cwp/view.asp?a=1798&q
=285770 (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); Public Corruption, OFF. ATT'Y GEN. GA., http://
law.ga.gov/02/ago/home/0,2705,87670814,00.html (follow "Crime and Crime Victims" tab; then
follow "Public Corruption" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); Public Integrity & Special Inves-
tigations Branch, KY: ATr'Y GEN. JACK CONWAY, http://ag.ky.gov/criminal/dci/special/ (last visited
Sept. 1, 2010); Special Prosecutions, KY: ATT'Y GEN. JACK CONWAY, http://ag.ky.gov/
criminal/special.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2010).
128. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1021 (2006); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/4 (2008); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7:6-c (2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-36 (2009); N.Y EXEC. LAW § 70 (McKinney
2010); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 109.95 (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-
1630(A)(4)(2009); TEx. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.021 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-7-
213, -312 (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-511(A) (2010); Pryor, supra note 127, at 267
(explaining that the Alabama attorney general's office maintains a public corruption section to
prosecute election fraud cases); Attorney General's Public Integrity Unit, NEV. ATr'Y GEN.,
http://ag.state.nv.us/integrity/integrity.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
129. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STATE MEDICAID FRAUD
CONTROL UNITS: ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2007, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/
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requires states to operate Medicaid fraud control units unless they receive
a waiver from the federal government.130 The federal government funds 75
percent of the operating costs of these units, with the states contributing
the other 25 percent."' In addition to bringing fraud cases, these units han-
dle claims of patient abuse and neglect, so charges can go beyond fraud,
embezzlement, false claims, and the like to include crimes such as negli-
gent homicide and sexual abuse.13 2 State-level prosecutors in many states
also handle others types of benefit fraud, such as welfare fraud"' and
workers' compensation fraud. 13 4
c. Regulatory Crimes
State-level prosecutors typically have the authority to pursue regula-
tory crimes. Although states vary in the precise mix, most states have a
state-level prosecutorial unit that prosecutes environmental crimes.'
publications/docs/mfcu/mfcu_2007.pdf. North Dakota is the exception. Stephen M. Blank et al.,
Health Care Fraud, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 701, 757 n.424 (2009).
130. Most states (forty-three) have placed these units within their attorney general's office, but
six states place them within some other state agency. LEVINSON, supra note 129, summary.
131. Id. at 1. The states and federal government share any money that is recovered from
Medicaid fraud investigations. Blank, supra note 129, at 757.
132. See LEVINSON, supra note 129, at 4-11 (describing homicide, sexual abuse, and other
charges brought in Medicaid fraud control unit investigations); Blank et al., supra note 129, at 757
(stating Medicaid fraud control units may prosecute abuse and neglect claims against certain facili-
ties).
133. See, e.g., About the Office, OFFICIAL WEBSITE ATT'Y GEN. MASS., supra note 127;
AG-Criminal Justice Bureau, OFF. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag/ 0,1607,7-164-
19441-60568--,00.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010); Criminal Justice Division, UTAH OFF. ATT'Y
GEN., http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/criminaljustice.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
134. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-518 (2006); N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 132(1)
(McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.84(B) (LexisNexis 2007); AG-Criminal Justice
Bureau, OFF. ATr'Y GEN., supra note 133 (Michigan); Insurance Fraud Support Unit, OFF. LA.
ArT'Y GEN., http://www.ag.state.1a.us (follow "Programs" hyperlink; then follow "Crime" hyper-
link; then follow "Insurance Fraud Support Unit" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 20, 2010); Workers'
Compensation Fraud Unit, NEv. Arr'Y GEN., http://ag.state.nv.us (follow "Office Organization"
hyperlink; then follow "Bureau of Criminal Justice" hyperlink; then follow "Workers' Compensa-
tion Fraud Unit" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 20, 2010).
135. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-263, -926 (2005); Pryor, supra note 127, at 266
(describing the duties and projects of the Alabama attorney general's Environmental Division);
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-109 (2002); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/44(m) (2008); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 455B.112 (West 1997); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 71-1933(10), -2105(3) (McKinney 1997);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-40-05 (2010); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27A, § 2-3-504(E) (2001); About the Office,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE ATr'y GEN. MASS., supra note 127; About the Office: Public Protection Depart-
ment, ARK. Arr'Y GEN. DUSTIN McDANIEL, http://www.ag.arkansas.gov/about-office_what_
wedo public.protectiondepartment.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2010); AG - Crime & Victims, OFF.
Arr'Y GEN., supra note 127 (Michigan); Criminal Division, OFF. LA. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 127;
Environmental Crimes Bureau, OFF. N.J. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.njdcj.org/ecb.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2010); Environmental Enforcement, OHIO Arr'Y GEN., http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/
About/Sections/Environmental-Enforcement (last visited Sept. 3, 2010); Protecting the Environ-
ment, MD. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.oag.state.md.us/lawenforcement.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010);
Role of the Office of the Attorney General, VIRGINIA.GOV, http://www.oag.state.va.us/OUR
OFFICE/Role.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010); Special Prosecutions Unit, COLo. ST. Arr'Y GEN.,
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In addition, state-level prosecutors typically handle business and white
collar crimes, including antitrust and sometimes securities violations, ei-
ther exclusively or concurrently with local prosecutors. Many state AGs
are also responsible for prosecuting criminal tax violations'
http://www.coloradoattomeygeneral.gov (follow "Departments" hyperlink; then follow "Special
Prosecutions Unit" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
136. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-603 (2009) (giving both state attorney general and
district attorney authority to prosecute securities violations); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 417E-9(b), 480-
20(a), 485A-508 (2004) (vesting authority in the Hawaii attorney general to bring criminal actions
dealing with corporate takeover law, criminal and civil antitrust actions, and criminal actions for
fraud under the state securities act); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-14 -508(g) (2004) (allowing the Idaho
attorney general to prosecute under state securities fraud law); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/6 (2008)
(vesting the Illinois attorney general with concurrent authority to bring criminal antitrust actions);
IND. CODE § 24-1-2-5 (1998) (granting the Indiana attorney general authority to bring antitrust
actions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.508(2) (West 2008) (giving the Iowa attorney general authority to
bring securities fraud cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a508(c) (West 2007) (vesting the Kansas
attorney general with power to bring criminal actions under state securities act); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1107 (2009) (Maine attorney general is responsible for prosecuting unlawful re-
straints of trade); MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAw § 11-207 (LexisNexis 2005) (Maryland attorney
general can prosecute antitrust violations); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-5-54 (2009) (Mississippi attorney
general has jurisdiction over white collar crimes); Mo. REv. STAT. § 416.051(2) (2000) (Missouri
attorney general has jurisdiction over antitrust cases); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-211, 212 (2008) (Ne-
braska attorney general has power over antitrust matters); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-M:9 (2000)
(New Hampshire attorney general can bring criminal action to redress unfair or deceptive trade
practices); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-10 (2000) (New Mexico attorney general has authority for
antitrust enforcement); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 342-b, 358 (McKinney 1996) (New York attorney
general is given authority to bring antitrust and securities prosecutions in New York); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 79, § 206(B) (2001) (Oklahoma attorney general can bring criminal actions under state antitrust
law); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1630(A)(7) (Supp. 2009); Tx. REV. CIv. STAT. CODE ANN. § 581-3
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-21.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (Utah attorney general has concur-
rent jurisdiction to bring actions under state securities act); About the Office, ARIz. ATr'Y GEN.
TERRY GODDARD, http://www.azag.gov/AboutOffice/#CRM (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (explaining
that the attorney general's office has jurisdiction over "white collar crime"); Antitrust and Business
Competition, CAL. OFF. ATT'Y GEN., http://ag.ca.gov/antitrust/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (noting
that the attorney general is responsible for civil and criminal antitrust enforcement); Bureau of
Criminal Justice, NEV. ATr'Y GEN., http://ag.state.nv.us/org/bcj/bcj.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010)
(describing Nevada attorney general's securities fraud unit); Career Opportunities: Division of
Criminal Law, CAL. OFF. Arr'Y GEN., http://ag.ca.gov/careers/descriptions/crimlaw.php (describing
the special crimes unit that prosecutes "largescale, investment and financial frauds and those in
which the elderly were targeted"); Criminal Division, OFF. LA. Arr'Y GEN., supra note 127; Law
Enforcement, MD. AT-r'y GEN., http://www.oag.state.md.us/lawenforcement.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2010) (noting that Maryland attorney general's office has a unit dedicated to white collar crimes);
Criminal Division, OFF. MICH. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag/ (follow "About the Of-
fice" hyperlink; then follow "Criminal Justice Bureau" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (noting
that Michigan attorney general's office handles criminal securities and fraud); Fighting Crime and
Fraud, TENN. OFF. AT-r'y GEN. & REP., http://www.tennessee.gov/attorneygeneral/crime/crime.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2010) ("The Attorney General ... exercises original prosecutorial powers in the
areas of securities and state contract fraud."); Financial Crimes and Antitrust Bureau, OFF. Arr'Y
GEN., http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (noting that the New Jersey attor-
ney general's office has unit responsible for white collar and antitrust crime).
137. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42-1004(E) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-35-
112 (West 2009); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/16 (2008); IND. CODE § 6-3-6-11 (1998); IowA CODE
§ 421.19 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-702, -5133 (1997); MINN. STAT. § 297E.13(6) (2007);
N.Y TAX LAw § 512(3) (McKinney 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 252(2) (2001); Criminal Justice
Division, UTAH OFF. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 133; Financial Crimes and Antitrust Bureau, OFF. N.J.
Arr'Y GEN., http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
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and consumer fraud.'3 1 State AGs also enforce a host of other regulatory
laws. 39
d. Conflicts
State AGs often have authority to step in when local prosecutors can-
not handle a case because of a conflict.'4 In addition to general provisions
138. AG authority over consumer fraud may be exclusively civil in some jurisdictions, but
others also have jurisdiction under criminal fraud statutes. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-104
(2007) (authorizing the Georgia attorney general and district attorneys to prosecute cases of residen-
tial mortgage fraud); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-213(3) (2010) (establishing that the Idaho attorney
general has concurrent authority with county attorneys over insurance fraud); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 205.372 (2009) (authorizing the Nevada attorney general to prosecute mortgage lending fraud);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(E)(3) (LexisNexis 2006) (authorizing the Ohio attorney general to
initiate criminal prosecutions for consumer law violations if the local prosecuting attorney declines
to prosecute or requests the attorney general to bring the case); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 762(B) (2001)
(establishing that the Oklahoma attorney general has "powers of a district attorney to investigate and
prosecute suspected violations of consumer laws"); About the Attorney General, COLO. ST. Arr'Y
GEN., http://www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gv/about-ag (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (noting that the
Colorado attorney general is responsible for enforcing consumer protection and antitrust laws);
Assisting Consumers, KAN. ATr'Y GEN., http://www.ksag.org/page/assisting-consumers (last visited
Sept. 3, 2010) (stating that the office is responsible for prosecuting violations of state consumer
protection act); Consumer Protection, N.D. Arr'Y GEN., http://www.ag.state.nd.us/CPAT/CPAT.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (explaining that North Dakota attorney general's "Consumer Protection
and Antitrust Division (CPAT) enforces the state's consumer fraud laws"); Division of Criminal
Justice, ST. N.J. OFF. Arr'Y GEN., http://www.njdcj.org/fincab.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2010) (ex-
plaining that dedicated unit handles investment and consumer fraud); Prosecutions FAQ, OFF. N.M.
Arr'Y GEN., supra note 124 (noting that the attorney general prosecutes pyramid scheme viola-
tions).
139. These include banking, see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 26-2247 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit.
6, § 1414(C) (2001); insurance fraud, see, e.g., Criminal Justice Division, UTAH OFF. ATT'Y GEN.,
supra note 133; Insurance Fraud Unit, NEV. Arr'Y GEN, http://ag.state.nv.us/org/bcj/ifu/ifu.htm
(last visited Sept. 3, 2010); public utilities, see, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 365:43-4 (1984); food
labeling, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-7 (1978); and labor law, see, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 214
(McKinney 2009). See also N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(3) (McKinney 2010) (giving New York's attorney
general authority to prosecute upon request by various state agencies).
140. See, e.g., 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-205(a)(3) (1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-
1650(C)(2) (West Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-112(a)(2) (West 2010); Telephone Inter-
view by Sam Raymond with Chris Topmiller, Unit Chief Special Prosecutor's Unit, Idaho Attorney
Gen.'s Office (June 16, 2009); Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Darrel Mullins, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Criminal Appeals Div., Iowa Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 11, 2009); Telephone
Interview by Sam Raymond with David McLaughlin, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen., Special Pros-
ecutor Unit, Ga. Dep't of Law (June 8, 2009); Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Judy
Fishburne, Supervising Legal Researcher, Nev. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 12, 2009); Telephone
Interview by Sam Raymond with Lee Davidson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Kan. Attorney Gen.'s
Office (June 15, 2009); Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Michael Atterbury, Deputy
Bureau Chief of the Trial Assistance Div., Ill. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 16, 2009); Telephone
Interview with Frank Brindisi, Assistant Attorney Gen., La. (Jan. 29, 2009); Telephone Interview
with Alexander, supra note 127; Telephone Interview with Jason Tran, Deputy Attorney General,
Cal. Off. of the Attorney Gen. (June 3, 2009); About the Office, ARiz. ATT'Y GEN. ThRRY GODDARD,
supra note 136; Crime and Safety, WASH. ST. OFF. A-r'Y GEN., http://www.atg.wa.gov/
page.aspx?ID-2332 (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Criminal Justice Division, UTAH OFF. Arr'y GEN.,
supra note 133; Kentucky Attorney General-Special prosecutions, OFF. ATT'Y GEN., http://
ag.ky.gov/criminal/special.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010); Opinions and Law Resources, MONT.
DEP'T JusT., http://www.doj.mt.gov/resources/default.asp (last visited Oct. 10 2010); Prosecutions
Division, N.M.A.G., http://www.nmag.gov/office/Divisions/Pros/Default.aspx# (last visited Oct. 10,
2010); Working with prosecuting attorneys in Missouri, Mo. Arr'Y GEN., http://ago.mo.gov/
prosecutors.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
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allowing the state AG to bring cases when there is a conflict, specific stat-
utes also seem to reflect this policy.141
2. The Infrequent Exercise of Discretion to
Intervene with Local Decision Making
Some attorneys general have broader authority under state law to inter-
vene in local prosecutions. This power stems from either the state AG's
authority to indict cases that cross county or district lines or a more general-
ized grant of statutory authority to bring charges whenever the AG is of the
view that it would be appropriate. Although both of these sources of power
could be used as a basis for large-scale state AG involvement in local mat-
ters, just about every attorney general with this kind of broad discretionary
power opts not to use it except in rare cases.
a. Multi-Jurisdictional Crime
Many states give a state-level prosecutor the authority to address crimes
that cross county or district lines. This authority is analogous to the power
federal prosecutors have under the Commerce Clause to address crimes that
cross state lines. Congress and federal prosecutors have used the interstate
dimensions of crime-no matter how tenuous-to enlarge federal prosecu-
torial power to cover traditionally local crimes.142
State-level prosecutors, in contrast, are virtually unanimous in their view
that multi-jurisdictional crime should be interpreted narrowly. With few ex-
ceptions,143 state AGs tend not to take expansive views of their power to
141. In Louisiana, the AG can supersede local district attorneys "for cause," LA. CONST. art.
IV, § 8, and in the rare cases in which this power has been used, it was because the local prosecutor
was self-interested in the prosecution at issue, see Charles J. Yeager & Lee Hargrave, The Power of
the Attorney General To Supersede a District Attorney: Substance, Procedure & Ethics, 51 LA. L.
REV. 733, 745 (1991). In Indiana, the AG has concurrent jurisdiction with local prosecutors to bring
an action when a sheriff is accused of failing to protect the life of a prisoner in the sheriff's custody.
IND. CODE § 4-6-2-1.1(3) (1998). Because a local prosecutor's office may have a conflict of interest
in bringing a case against a local sheriff, this law reflects the same basic policy of using state-level
prosecutors because a conflict of interest could undermine proper enforcement of the law.
142. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006) (making arson a federal crime if the property set on
fire is "any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign com-
merce"); id. § 2119 (creating a federal crime of car jacking as long as the motor vehicle involved has
"been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce"). The Senate passed a bill
in 1994 that would have made it a federal crime to comnit any crime with a handgun that crossed
state lines, and if murder was committed with a gun that had crossed state lines, the bill would have
authorized the death penalty. Beale, supra note 36, at 1649-50. As Judge Friendly observed, just
because there is an element of a crime that crosses state lines does not mean that the crime itself is
of federal interest. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 58 (1973) ("Why
should the federal government care if a Manhattan businessman takes his mistress to sleep with him
in Greenwich, Connecticut, although it would not if the love-nest were in Port Chester, NY?").
143. See infra Section I.C. Although I was unable to obtain an interview with someone in the
Oklahoma attorney general's office, the website description of the MultiCounty Grand Jury indi-
cates that it is used largely for public corruption. See Office Sections, OKLA. OFF. Arr'Y GEN.,
http://www.oag.state.ok.us (follow "Sections" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). The South
Carolina AG has authority to bring a range of crimes to the state grand jury, most of which involve
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bring charges for crimes that cross jurisdictional boundaries. For example,
California has a "Special Crimes Unit" that works with local prosecutors
upon request in complex cases involving multi-jurisdictional activity. This
can include "high-tech crimes where the scope and complexity of the of-
fenses exceed the investigative and prosecutorial resources of local law
enforcement."'" In Colorado, the state AG brings multi-jurisdictional organ-
ized crime cases when a state investigator brings the case to the AG's
attention, but even then the AG's office first obtains consent from the local
prosecutors in the jurisdictions affected by the crime.145
In Illinois, the law vesting the state attorney general with the authority to
convene a state grand jury in cases involving more than one county contains
numerous limits on the exercise of that power. In addition to showing that
the offense involves more than one county, the AG must also demonstrate
that a county grand jury cannot effectively investigate and indict the case
and either that all relevant state's attorneys consent to the state grand jury or,
if one or more state's attorneys objects, that there is good cause for impanel-
ing it.
New York's law is similarly restrictive. The state has an organized crime
task force that addresses organized crime activities "carried on either be-
tween two or more counties" or between a county in New York and another
jurisdiction.14' The task force includes a deputy, but the AG's office cannot
bring criminal charges without the approval of the governor and the appro-
priate district attorney.148 So, for example, because the Manhattan district
attorney typically does not consent, the AG lacks authority to bring any such
cases involving Manhattan.
b. Broad Grants Exercised Sparingly
Some states give the AG the authority to prosecute any criminal case
and leave it to the attorney general to decide whether to intervene. On
subject areas that are commonly within the jurisdiction of attorneys general in other states, such as
election crimes, public corruption, securities crimes, and environmental crimes. S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-7-1630(A) (West Supp. 2009). But the attorney general of South Carolina also has jurisdiction
over areas that are not typically brought by a state-level prosecutor in other states, including narcot-
ics, criminal gang activity, terrorism, and false statements related to immigration. Id. The attorney
general's authority over drug crimes is directly tied to its multi-county nature. Id. § 14-7-
1630(A)(1). The office brings a number of these cases, but that number varies depending on which
counties are involved. Telephone Interview by Darryl Stein with Curtis Pauling, S.C. State Grand
Jury Office (June 26, 2009). But as the Supreme Court of South Carolina has noted, "[I]t is a fact of
common knowledge that the duty to actually prosecute criminal cases is performed primarily and
almost exclusively by the solicitors in their respective circuits except in unusual cases or when the
solicitors call upon the Attorney General for assistance." State ex rel. McLeod v. Snipes, 223 S.E.2d
853, 855 (S.C. 1976).
144. Career Opportunities: Division of Criminal Law, CAL. OFF. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 136.
145. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Rob Shapiro, First Assistant Attorney Gen.
for Special Prosecutions, Colo. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 11, 2009).
146. 725 ILL. CoM-P. STAT. 215/3 (2008). Circuit judges assess the AG's claims. Id.
147. N.Y EXEC. LAw § 70-a(l)(a) (McKinney 2010).
148. Id. § 70-a(7).
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paper, this is a dramatic departure from the limited jurisdiction of state-
level prosecutors in other states. In practice, there is typically little differ-
ence. Most state-level prosecutors who possess broad jurisdictional grants
of power are exercising their discretion sparingly and with a focus on
149
specific areas.
In California, the state constitution gives the AG "all the powers of a
district attorney" to prosecute "[w]henever in the opinion of the Attorney
General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any coun-
ty."'5 o Yet, even with this broad constitutional mandate, the AG in California
limits herself to post-conviction proceedings, benefits fraud, and complex
white collar and high-tech crimes.'
Similarly, in Nebraska, the AG has the authority to prosecute "any cause
or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or inter-
ested."5 2 In practice, the AG does "not normally get involved unless
requested" by a county attorney, which happens in large measure because
county prosecutors are part-time and often need more resources. '3 Without
such a request, it is "very, very rare" for the AG to step in when a local
prosecutor has decided not to prosecute.
The Oregon AG may, when he or she "considers the public interest re-
quires, with or without the concurrence of the district attorney, direct the
county grand jury to convene for the investigation and consideration of such
matters of a criminal nature as the Attorney General desires to submit to
it."' 5 Despite having the legal power to act without approval from the dis-
149. Earlier studies of attorney general practice have similarly found that AGs rarely initiate
or intervene in local prosecutions. THE NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. COMM. ON THE OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 107
(Oct. 1977) ("There is little statistical data on how frequently Attorneys General initiate prosecu-
tions, but it appears that this power is infrequently exercised."); Earl H. De Long, Powers and Duties
of the State Attorney-General in Criminal Prosecution, 25 Am. INST. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 358,
395 (1935) ("Although the attorney-generals of most of the forty-eight states are authorized to con-
duct criminal prosecutions . . . the extent of state participation in this phase of criminal law
enforcement is negligible.").
150. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
151. See Career Opportunities: Division of Criminal Law, CAL. OFF. Arr'Y GEN., supra note
136 (showing that California attorney general's criminal division does not have a section with the
responsibility to act as a district attorney to prosecute state laws that are being inadequately en-
forced).
152. NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-203 (2008); see also id. § 84-204 ("The Attorney General ... shall
have the same powers and prerogatives in each of the several counties of the state as the county
attorneys have in their respective counties.").
153. Telephone Interview with John Freudenberg, Criminal Bureau Chief, Neb. Attorney
Gen.'s Office (June 2,2009).
154. Id. One case where the AG did bring charges after the local prosecutor decided not to
prosecute involved a twenty-eight-year-old who had sex with a thirteen-year-old girl and then mar-
ried her. Id. It is noteworthy that state law requires the AG to create a child protection division, and
that division is authorized to prosecute cases if a county attorney declines to do so. NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-205 (13) (2003).
155. OR. REV. STAT. § 180.070(2) (2009).
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trict attorney, it is "extremely rare" and perhaps may never have been the
case that the AG acted without the concurrence of the local prosecutor.
In South Dakota, the AG is authorized to bring criminal cases "when-
ever in his judgment the welfare of the state demands."' 5' In practice,
however, the South Dakota AG generally brings cases only when local
prosecutors request assistance. 58
The Iowa AG likewise has the authority to prosecute cases "when, in
the attorney general's judgment, the interest of the state requires such ac-
tion."'" But the Iowa AG typically uses this discretion when a local
prosecutor refers the case, which happens "when the county attorney has a
conflict of interest" or "when an especially serious or complicated case
requires prosecution resources in addition to those already available in the
county attorney's office."'" The AG does take a more aggressive view of
the state's role in drug cases, with five state-level prosecutors responsible
for bringing major methamphetamine drug cases,6' but otherwise the Iowa
AG mainly follows the blueprint of most other states in terms of the areas
in which she brings cases.162
The Massachusetts AG similarly has broad authority to bring criminal
charges, but in practice the office "focuses on cases that reflect the state-
wide jurisdiction and areas of investigative and prosecutorial expertise not
156. Telephone Interview with Jon Fussner, supra note 127.
157. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(2) (2010); see also id. § 23-3-3 ("In any and all criminal
proceedings in any and all courts of this state and in any county or part of the state, the attorney
general shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the state's attorney or state's attorneys of the several
counties of the state.").
158. Sometimes the state's division of criminal investigation will bring a case to the AG, and
the AG will prosecute it, but more often, the AG will give the case to local prosecutors unless the
case is a major one. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Katie Hanson, Assistant Attorney
Gen., S.D. (Aug. 14, 2009).
159. IOWA CODE § 13.2(l)(b) (2010).
160. See Area Prosecutions Division, OFF. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/
fighting-crime/prosecuting-felony-offense.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (listing cases "requiring
specialized legal training" including "Medicaid fraud, violence against women, environmental
crime, securities fraud, obscenity, correctional institution crime and tax crimes").
161. See New Summary ofAttorney General's Office Actions to Fight Meth, OFF. ATr'Y GEN.,
http://www.iowa.gov/government/ag/fighting-crime/summary-fight-meth.html (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
162. Similarly, although some states recognize that the AG possesses broad common law
powers, the attorney general almost never uses those powers. For example, even though Arkansas
recognizes such broad common law powers, State ex rel. Williams v. Karston, 187 S.W.2d 327, 329
(Ark. 1945), the attorney general does not exercise those powers to initiate prosecutions or intervene
in the decisions of local prosecutors. Telephone Interview with Nicana Sherman, Assistant Attorney
Gen., Ark. (Jan. 29, 2009) (noting that the AG's office would not get involved with an ongoing local
prosecution and that AG prosecutors might assist local prosecutors at their request but otherwise the
AG does not initiate prosecutions except in specific categories of cases such as environmental,
Medicare fraud, and business crimes). The Illinois AG also possesses common law powers, which
include the authority to initiate prosecutions. People v. Buffalo Confectionary Co., 401 N.E.2d 546,
549 (Ill. 1980). In practice, however, the AG brings cases in limited areas set out by statute, when
local prosecutors request it, if there is a conflict with the local prosecutor, or if the case is particu-
larly complex. Telephone Interview with Michael Atterbury, supra note 140.
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addressed by other law enforcement offices, particularly in the protection
of taxpayer funds and the integrity of governmental agencies." 63
The New Jersey AG may "participate in" or "initiate" "any investiga-
tion, criminal action or proceeding," whenever the AG is of the opinion
that "the interests of the State will be furthered by so doing."'64 The New
Jersey AG seems to have been more willing to exercise this power than
some of her counterparts in other states, using it to tackle organized crime
and gangs.'65 But even with this somewhat more aggressive view of how
discretionary authority should be used, the AG generally only exercises
discretion to bring charges in major cases and will give cases to local
prosecutors where there is less criminal activity than originally sus-
pected.'66
Some states allow AGs to bring any type of criminal action as long as
it is at the request of the governor,167 one of the legislative branches,'6 or
some other government official.' 69 But these political officials have been
no more willing to interfere with local prosecutors than state AGs. In
Colorado, for example, the governor has requested the AG to bring a
prosecution only once in ten years."o In Georgia, where the governor can
163. About the Office, OFFICIAL WEBSITEATr'Y GEN. MASS., supra note 127.
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-107 (West 2001).
165. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with John Quelch, Assistant Attorney Gen., Of-
fice of the N.J. Attorney Gen. (June 15, 2009).
166. Id. State AGs do not necessarily need broad discretionary authority to target organized
violent crime. Many states have adopted a state version of the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization ("RICO") Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006), which targets enterprise crini-
nality. See Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion under State RICO, 24 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 79, 80 (1990) (noting that more than half the states have a comparable RICO statute); A.
Laxmidas Sawkar, Note, From the Mafia to Milking Cows: State RICO Act Expansion, 41 ARiz. L.
REV. 1133, 1134 n.6 (1999) (citing thirty state RICO statutes). State RICO statutes could be used,
like the federal RICO statute, to go after violent crimes by affiliated individuals. Neither my inter-
views nor a search of caselaw involving questions about state RICO prosecutions, however, revealed
state RICO laws to be a widely employed source of criminal prosecution authority for state AGs
outside areas already targeted by state-level prosecutors.
167. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. V, § 3, 4; MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-31-101(1)(a) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2227 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02
(LexisNexis 2007) (governor can ask AG to prosecute a person who has been indicted).
168. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. V, § 3(a)(2) (allowing the general assembly to direct a prosecu-
tion by law or joint resolution); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-702 (1997) (allowing the Kansas attorney
general to prosecute "when required by the governor or either branch of the legislature"); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 165.25(lm) (West 2010) (providing that Wisconsin's statewide department of justice will
appear in criminal matters, including as prosecutor, "[ilf requested by the governor or either house
of the legislature").
169. In Kentucky, the AG can bring criminal cases when requested:
by the Governor, or by any of the courts or grand juries of the Commonwealth, or upon receiv-
ing a communication from a sheriff, mayor, or majority of a city legislative body stating that
his participation in a given case is desirable to effect the administration of justice and the
proper enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth.
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
170. Telephone Interview with Rob Shapiro, supra note 145.
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also request the AG to represent the state in any criminal case,'7' the AG's
office estimates that the governor requested AG involvement fewer than
ten times in the past twelve years.' 72 Governors in Idaho,17 Mississippi,174
Missouri,'" Ohio,'76 Virginia, 7 and Washington77 have been similarly reluc-
tant to use their power to request AG involvement in criminal matters.17 In
Kansas, either branch of the legislature or the governor can request that the
AG prosecute an action, but this is seldom if ever done.so Instead, the AG
typically intervenes only when a county attorney requests help because of a
conflict of interest or because of insufficient resources to handle the case.
In Kentucky, the governor, a mayor, a majority of a city legislative body, a
court or grand jury,' and local prosecutors can also request that the AG in-
tervene in cases.' In practice, local prosecutors and judges are the ones
who make these requests, not the governor, mayors, legislators, or sheriffs.'
In Louisiana, the attorney general can institute or intervene in criminal pro-
ceedings or supersede the district attorney for cause with court
171. GA. CONsT. art. V, § 3,14.
172. Telephone Interview with David McLaughlin, supra note 140.
173. Telephone Interview with Chris Topmiller, supra note 140.
174. Telephone Interview with Stan Alexander, supra note 127.
175. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Ted Bruce, Deputy Chief Counsel of the
Pub. Safety Div., Mo. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 11, 2009).
176. Telephone Interview with James Slagle, Chief of Criminal Justice Section, Ohio Attorney
Gen.'s Office (July 15, 2009).
177. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Patrick Dorgan, Dir. of Criminal Prosecu-
tions and Enforcement Div., Va. Attorney Gen.'s Office (Aug. 14, 2009).
178. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Sara Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Wash.
(June 4, 2009).
179. For a discussion of the historical reluctance of New York governors to appoint special
prosecutors to supersede district attorneys, see Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander, Peril-
ous Executive Power-Perspective on Special Prosecutors in New York, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 49-
52(1987).
180. Telephone Interview with Lee Davidson, supra note 140.
181. Id. The Wisconsin Department of Justice, a statewide agency, is similarly authorized to
bring charges in criminal matters upon request of the governor or either house of the legislature.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.25(1m) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Act 406). Although I was unable to
interview anyone in this office, there is little evidence to suggest that this authority is exercised in
Wisconsin to a greater extent than it is in other states that follow this framework. The Wisconsin
department does have a "Division of Criminal Investigation" that investigates crimes "that are state-
wide in nature or importance," which the website identifies as arson, financial crimes, illegal
gaming, computer crimes, drug trafficking, government corruption, and crimes against children.
Agency Division/Bureau Descriptions, Wis. DEP'T JusT., http://www.doj.state.wi.us/site/divs.asp
(last visited Sept. 9, 2010). The department will also assist local law enforcement at their request in
homicide investigations and cases involving multi-jurisdictional fraud or theft. Id. But I did not find
any indication that the department brings its own prosecutions without the request of local prosecu-
tors or that the governor or either house of the legislature is requesting the department's involvement
on a regular basis.
182. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.200(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
183. Id. § 15.190.
184. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Tom Marshall, Assistant Attorney Gen. for
Special Prosecution, Ky. Attorney Gen.'s Office (July 20, 2009).
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authorization.' The AG in Louisiana has sought to use this authority
rarely. Instead, as elsewhere, the AG typically gets involved with local
cases only with the district attorney's consent. 8 1
3. The Limited Supervisory Authority of State-Level Prosecutors
In most states, the relationship between state-level and local prosecutors
is coordinate, not hierarchical, with the exception of appellate jurisdiction.
a. No Hierarchical Relationship
"[I]n practically all jurisdictions, either the constitution or laws of the
state make the two offices separate and distinct, and vest in the prosecut-
ing attorney certain powers, and impose upon him certain duties, which
can neither be increased nor decreased by the attorney-general."' Even in
those states that have laws on the books that vest a state attorney general
with supervisory powers, the relationship between local and state prosecu-
tors is typically cooperative, and the AG in most places does not seek to
centralize authority over prosecution.
In some states, this is because state courts have interpreted these provi-
sions narrowly. For example, even though the California state constitution
gives the AG "direct supervision over every district attorney,"" 9 California
courts have concluded that this "does not contemplate absolute control and
direction."'" Hawaii is similar. Local prosecutors in Honolulu are author-
ized to "[p]rosecute offenses against the laws of the state under the
authority of the attorney general."'9' But the Hawaii courts have interpreted
that provision not to confer "power to usurp, at his sole discretion, the
functions of the public prosecutor."1 92 Instead, the AG in Hawaii can inter-
vene in local prosecutions when it is "clearly apparent that compelling
185. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 2. The cause requirement requires the AG to show "'a right or
interest of the state is not being satisfactorily represented or asserted by a district attorney.'" See
Yeager & Hargrave, supra note 141, at 737-38 (quoting Lee Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 LA. L. REv. 765, 835 (1977)).
186. Yeager & Hargrave, supra note 141, at 735 (noting that Louisiana's attorney general has
used this power only twice as of 1991).
187. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 8, cl. 2 ("[Tjhe attorney general shall have authority. . . upon the
written request of a district attorney, to advise and assist in the prosecution of any criminal
case...."); Telephone Interview with Frank Brindisi, supra note 140. Similarly, in Tennessee,
judges can appoint an attorney pro tempore under the constitution if a district attorney fails to prose-
cute according to the law, TENN. CONsT. art. VI, § 5, but judges have not used this power. Telephone
Interview by Sam Raymond with Mark Fulks, Senior Counsel for the Criminal Justice Div. of the
Attorney Gen., Tenn. (Aug. 14, 2009).
188. State v. Finch, 280 P. 910, 912 (Kan. 1929).
189. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 13.
190. People v. Brophy, 120 P.2d 946,953 (Cal. App. 2d 1942).
191. Revised Charter of Honolulu § 8-104(b) (2001).
192. Amemiya v. Sapienza, 629 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Haw. 1981).
556 [Vol. 109:519
February 20111 Federalism and Criminal Law 557
public interests require"' it, a situation that has rarely been found by the
AG because there are only four counties in the state, the AG believes they
do a good job, and the AG is able to talk things through with local prose-
cutors whenever any issues arise.' 94 The Idaho AG has statutory authority
"[w]hen required by the public service, to repair to any county in the state
and assist the prosecuting attorney thereof in the discharge of duties."
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted this narrowly,'96 and the AG
mainly uses this power in cases involving conflicts of interest by the local
prosecutor or to support counties that are too small to bring complex cases
on their own.'97 Likewise, in Nebraska, though the AG may "[e]xercise
supervisory powers over all district attorneys of the state in all matters
pertaining to the duties of their offices,"'98 the Nebraska Supreme Court
has made clear that this "cannot sensibly be read as a grant of power to
usurp the function of the district attomey."'" The Nebraska AG therefore
intervenes in local actions only when there is a conflict of interest.
Courts have taken a narrow view of statutory language that allows AGs
to "assist" in local prosecutions "when, in [the AG's] judgment, the inter-
est of the people of the State requires it."20' The Illinois courts have held
that this provision does not allow the AG "to take exclusive charge" of
cases where the state attorney also has authority.202 More importantly, the
AG's office itself has used this power in a limited fashion. The AG does
not intervene in local prosecutions, but instead provides assistance upon
request by local prosecutors and takes over when there is a conflict or the
193. Id. This includes a local prosecutor's refusal to act when it "amounts to a serious derelic-
tion of duty on his part, or where, in the unusual case, it would be highly improper for the public
prosecutor and his deputies to act." Id.
194. Telephone Interview with Bridget Holthus, Special Assistant to the Haw. Attorney Gen.
(May 28, 2009).
195. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-1401(7) (2006).
196. Newman v. Lance, 922 P.2d 395, 399-400 (Idaho 1996). The version of this provision
interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court was even more favorable to broad AG authority than the law
as it is currently written: the version in 1996 stated that the Idaho attorney general was allowed to
"exercise supervisory powers over prosecuting attorneys in all matters pertaining to their duties."
State v. Summer, 76 P.3d 963, 968 (Idaho 2003) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-1401 (1996)). In
1998, the Idaho legislature omitted this provision, which the Idaho Supreme Court has observed
"apparently reduc[es] the authority of the attorney general in relation to county prosecuting attor-
neys." Id.
197. Telephone Interview with Chris Topmiller, supra note 140.
198. Ryan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 503 P.2d 842, 846 n.4 (Nev. 1972) (Mowbray, J.,
dissenting).
199. Id. at 844 (majority opinion).
200. Telephone Interview with Judy Fishburne, supra note 140.
201. 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/4 (2009). The Illinois attorney general also has the duty to
assist local prosecutors when they request it. Id.
202. Illinois v. Dasaky, 709 N.E.2d 635, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citing People v. Buffalo
Confectionary Co., 401 N.E.2d 546, 549 (Ill. 1980)).
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203
matter is particularly complex. Indiana's law mirrors the law in
Illinois. Just as its neighboring state uses this power sparingly, so does
Indiana. The AG does not view itself as having a right to intervene in local
judgments, but rather offers assistance when local prosecutors need it, par-
205ticularly in complicated cases.
In New Jersey, the AG "shall maintain a general supervision over said
county prosecutors with a view to obtaining effective and uniform enforce-
ment of the criminal laws throughout the State."206The New Jersey Supreme
Court has clarified that this does not mean that there is an "ordinary chain of
command between the attorney-general and the county prosecutors," even
though the AG does have the authority to "ensure the proper and efficient
handling of the county prosecutors' 'criminal business.' ,,207 And, as a matter
of practice, the New Jersey AG typically intervenes only in cases where
208there is a conflict of interest with the local prosecutor.
The attorney general in Pennsylvania "may petition the court having juris-
diction over any criminal proceeding to permit the Attorney General to
supersede the district attorney."209 But it is up to the judge whether to grant the
petition, and the AG must "establish[] by a preponderance of the evidence that
the district attorney has failed or refused to prosecute and such failure or
refusal constitutes abuse of discretion."210 As one court has observed, this is a
"narrowly circumscribed power" that rests on "cumbersome court proceed-
211ings" and therefore does not undermine the district attorney's autonomy.
By requiring judicial review of any request to supersede, the Pennsylvania
203. Telephone Interview with Michael Atterbury, supra note 140. Utah appears to follow a
similar framework. The AG has authority to "exercise supervisory powers over the district and
county attorneys of the state in all matters pertaining to the duties of their office." UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 67-5-1(6) (LexisNexis 2010). The AG's website indicates that the AG's office views this as a
cooperative relationship more than a hierarchical one. The state-level prosecutors "regularly consult
with and actively assist prosecutors throughout the state, often in high-profile and difficult or
sensitive cases." Criminal Justice Division, UTAH OFF. ATT'Y GEN., supra note 133. State-level
attorneys "frequently handle cases for county attorneys who have a conflict of interest" or in rural
areas with small offices that "request assistance with major cases." Id. Although no one from the
AG's office would call to confirm, it appears from this description and a search of Utah caselaw that
the AG is not exercising direct supervisory control or interfering regularly with local matters unless
requested.
204. Compare IND. CODE § 4-6-1-6 (1998), with 15 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 205/4 (2009), Buffalo
Confectionary, 401 N.E.2d at 549, and Dasaky, 303 IIl. App. 3d. at 992.
205. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Bryan Corbin, Public Info. Officer for Pol-
icy and Litig., Ind. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 16, 2009).
206. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-103 (West 2001).
207. Yurick v. State, 875 A.2d 898, 903 (N.J. 2005) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted).
208. Telephone Interview with John Quelch, supra note 165.
209. 71 PA. STAT. ANN. § 732-205(a)(4) (West 1990).
210. Id.
211. Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1999).
558 [Vol. 109:519
February 2011] Federalism and Criminal Law 559
legislature was careful not to " 'imping[e] upon the jurisdiction and duties of
the constitutionally created office of county-elected district attorney.' ,212
Unlike the courts in other states, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has
not interpreted a broad statutory grant narrowly. New Hampshire law states
that the AG "shall have and exercise general supervision of the criminal cas-
es,"2 3 and that county attorneys are "under the direction of the attorney
general."2 4 The Supreme Court has concluded this "give[s] [the AG] the
power to control, direct and supervise criminal law enforcement by the
county attorneys in cases where he deems it in the public interest."2 5 But
while the highest court in the state has not limited the AG's power under this
law, the AG itself has taken a narrow view in practice. The New Hampshire
AG's office seldom intervenes in cases without the request of a county
216prosecutor.
This same kind of relationship between the AG and state's attorneys ex-
ists in other states. Formally, the AG in South Dakota has the statutory
power "[lt]o consult with, advise, and exercise supervision over the several
state's attorneys of the state."217 In practice, the relationship is not hierarchi-
cal. The AG gets involved in local prosecutions only when local prosecutors
218
ask for help. The story is largely the same in Montana. By statute, the
Montana AG has the duty "to exercise supervisory power over county attor-
neys ... [which] include[s] the power to order and direct county attorneys in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their office."2 9 If directed by the AG,
the county prosecutor must bring a prosecution.220 Although the AG has used
this authority in Montana, particularly in capital cases and crimes against
children, the power has been exercised "infrequent[ly]" and typically the AG
221does not intervene in local matters unless requested.
To be sure, not every state AG has interpreted what seems to be broad
statutory supervisory power so narrowly. In Iowa, the AG has a duty to
"[s]upervise county attorneys in all matters pertaining to the duties of their
212. Commonwealth v. Carsia, 491 A.2d 237, 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (quoting COMMON-
WEALTH OF PA. JOINT STATE Gov'T COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ELECTED
ATTORNEY GEN. 5 (1978)). For an example of a matter in which a trial court rejected an AG request
to supersede when a district attorney refused to bring a homicide charge against a policeman who
killed a civilian, see Commonwealth v. Schab, 383 A.2d 819 (Pa. 1978).
213. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:6 (2003).
214. Id. § 7:34; see also id. § 7.11 ("[An] officer or person, in the enforcement of [any crimi-
nal] law, shall be subject to the control of the attorney general whenever in the discretion of the
latter he shall see fit to exercise the same.").
215. Wyman v. Danais, 147 A.2d 116, 118 (N.H. 1958).
216. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Stephen Fuller, Senior Assistant Attorney
Gen., N.H. Attorney Gen.'s Office (June 16, 2009).
217. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-1(5) (2004).
218. Interview with Katie Hanson, supra note 158.
219. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(5) (2009).
220. Id.
221. Telephone Interview by Sam Raymond with Mark McLaverty, Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Mont. (June 11, 2009).
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offices."222 Unlike the AGs in some states, the Iowa AG does use this author-
ity, particularly when the case involves a serious felony or the local
223prosecutor has limited resources. Supervision in this context can mean
telling local prosecutors to stop a prosecution or to commence one. But even
though the AG interprets this power broadly, the office uses the authority
"prudently." 224
The dominant picture in the states is one where the AG seeks to forge a
cooperative relationship with local prosecutors by responding to their needs
and working with them, not taking matters out of their control. If the local
prosecutor needs investigative help, forensic support, a larger budget, lobby-
ing assistance, or anything else that the AG is in a position to give, the AG
typically seeks to provide it to make sure that criminal justice works well
within his or her state. James Tierney, the former attorney general of Maine,
often counsels new attorneys general, and he emphasizes their responsibility
to get things done using interpersonal relationships and the network of crim-
inal justice professionals within the state. As he puts it, states and their
attorneys general can and must subscribe to a "fix it" culture of solving
225problems, rather than a concern with turf battles. This produces the non-
hierarchical and cooperative relationships seen time and again among prose-
cutors within states.
b. State-Level Prosecutors' Control over the Development of Law
While states typically take a hands-off approach in terms of taking
charge of local prosecutions, there is an exception. Even among those states
that generally defer to local prosecutors, 226almost all states give the attorney
general authority over appeals in the state's highest court.22 This appellate
222. IOWA CODE § 13.2(1)(h) (2010).
223. Telephone Interview with Darrel Mullins, supra note 140.
224. Id.
225. Email from James Tierney, supra note 87.
226. A stark example of this is probably West Virginia, where the AG does not have authority
to prosecute criminal cases, but does handle appeals before the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. See Criminal Matters, W.V. ATr'Y GEN., http://www.wvago.gov/attomeygeneral.cfm?fx=
duties (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
227. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. V, § 3, 14; MD. CONsT. art. V, § 3(a)(1); ALA. CODE § 36-15-
1(2) (LexisNexis 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-193(A)(1) (2004); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 25-16-
704(a) (2002); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12512 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a)
(2009); FLA. STAT. 16.01(4) (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4909 (2004); 15 ILL. COMP. STAT.
205/4 (2000); IND. CODE § 4-6-2-1 (1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 13.2(1)(a) (West 2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-702 (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.020 (LexisNexis 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 14.28 (1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.01 (West 2005); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7-5-29 (1972); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 27.050 (2000) (except misdemeanors); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(1) (2009); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-205(10) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 228.140 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7:6
(2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 8-5-2(A) (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-02(1) (2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 54-12-01(1) (2003); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 109.02 (LexisNexis 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit.
74, § 18b(A)(1) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-7-40 (West Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-
11-1(1) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-6-109(b)(2) (2010); Tx. GOV'T. CODE ANN. § 402.021
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-1(2) (LexisNexis 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-511(A)
(2010); W.VA. CODE § 5-3-2 (2010); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 165.25(1) (West 2010); WYo. STAT.
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authority gives the AG an important mechanism for overseeing local prose-
cutors, even in the absence of direct supervisory control, because local
prosecutors learn which points of law the AG will defend on appeal and
which ones she will not. This, in turn, can affect positions local prosecutors
take in the first instance.
4. Less-Populated States: The Exceptions that Prove the Rule
Some less-populated states give state-level actors more control over
criminal prosecutions, but on closer inspection, each of these states follows
the same basic model of limited authority. Consider first the three states that
give state-level prosecutors the primary responsibility for all criminal prose-
cutions. In Alaska and Rhode Island, that authority rests directly with the
state attorney general.228 In Delaware, the AG appoints the state prosecutor,
who manages the criminal division of the state's department of justice,
which is responsible for bringing all criminal cases.229 Because the state
prosecutor is appointed by the AG and reports to the AG's chief deputy,230 it
is fair to characterize prosecutions in Delaware as under the control of a
statewide prosecutor.
Although Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island give prosecutorial control
to a statewide actor, they are still properly viewed as conforming to the gen-
eral pattern in most states. Each of these states is of a size that approximates
ANN. § 9-1-603(a)(ii) (2010); State v. Aragon, 234 P.2d 356, 358 (N.M. 1950); Telephone Interview
with Jon Fussner, supra note 127; Telephone Interview with Paul Heinzel, N.J. Attorney Gen.'s
Office (June 2, 2009) (explaining that New Jersey attorney general can supersede in cases where
county prosecutor appeals, though this power is rarely exercised). Some states vary from this ap-
proach. In Kansas, the attorney general delegates this power to local prosecutors, who are permitted
to handle the appeals, as long as they first file their briefs with the AG's office. This gives the AG's
office the opportunity to evaluate the briefs to determine whether it should handle the appeal itself.
Telephone Interview with Lee Davidson, supra note 140. In New York, the AG is entitled to notice
when the constitutionality of a statute, rule, or regulation is at issue, so the AG can decide whether
to intervene to defend the law being challenged. N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 71 (McKinney 2010). In Wash-
ington, the prosecuting attorneys in the counties handle their own appeals, and the AG steps in only
in "exceptional cases at the insistence of local prosecutors." Telephone Interview with Sara Olson,
supra note 178. Similarly, in Pennsylvania, the AG handles appeals only "in his discretion, upon the
request of the district attorney" or if a specific law otherwise allows. 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-
205(c) (1990). In Connecticut, local prosecutors can bring appeals, see infra note 248, though only
two state's attorneys currently do. In Georgia, the AG is responsible only for capital felony actions
in the state's highest court. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-15-3(5) (2002). But the AG's office also files briefs
in cases where it lacks jurisdiction if it is a case of significance to the state. Telephone Interview
with David McLaughlin, supra note 140. The Hawaii AG also lacks exclusive authority over crimi-
nal appeals before the state's highest court, Telephone Interview with Bridget Holthus, supra note
194, as does the Massachusetts AG, Telephone Interview with David Friedman, First Assistant At-
tomey Gen., Mass. (June 8, 2009).
228. ALASKA STAT. § 44.23.020(4) (2008); CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001, 2 (2002).
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 2504(6), 2505(c) (2003).
230. The heads of the three county offices in Delaware are also appointed by the attorney
general and report to the state prosecutor. Preventing Crime, DE. DEP'T JusT.: ATT'Y GEN.'S OFF.,
http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov (follow "Preventing Crime" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3,
2010).
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231'
the largest counties of some of the larger, more populous states. The popu-
lations of Alaska and Delaware would not put them among the top ten cities
in the country.232 At just over one million, Rhode Island is more populous
than Alaska and Delaware, but that size still puts Rhode Island on par with a
large U.S. city.233 In terms of geographic area, Rhode Island and Delaware
are the smallest states in the country. Thus, the statewide prosecutors in
these states represent relatively small communities, and therefore reflect
local preferences.M
This is also true of the three northeastern states that vest authority in
state-level prosecutors to bring homicide prosecutions and pursue other
crimes that in most states are brought by local-level prosecutors. In Maine,
the AG has exclusive responsibility for bringing homicide prosecutions in
235the state. In neighboring New Hampshire, the AG brings all murder cases
236
and investigates most homicides and prosecutes cases where the defendant
is charged with a crime "punishable with death or imprisonment for life."237
In Vermont, the AG is responsible for prosecuting homicides and for other
criminal matters "when, in his judgment, the interests of the state so re-
quire," which has in practice included a variety of crimes that are elsewhere
pursued by local officials, such as domestic violence and felonies involving
firearms. 238
231. See Hills, supra note 77, at 211 ("[Sltates [with] small populations ... are functionally
equivalent to the county or municipal governments of other states."). Rhode Island (1,050,788) is
more populous, but is still comparable to a large U.S. city. See U.S. Census Bureau July 2008 Resi-
dent Population Data, U.S. CENSUs BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2009/
ranks/rank0l.html (published Dec. 22, 2008).
232. See Alaska QuickFacts fmom the U.S. Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/02000.html (last revised Aug. 16, 2010); Delaware QuickFacts
from the U.S. Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
10000.html (last revised Aug. 16, 2010).
233. See U.S. Census Bureau July 2008 Resident Population Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 231.
234. See Hills, supra note 77, at 211-12 (discussing Connecticut and Rhode Island specifi-
cally and raising the general point that small states are more properly viewed as local governments).
In fact, Alaska, Connecticut, and Rhode Island do not even have counties as relevant governmental
units. DALE KRANE ET AL., HOME RULE IN AMERICA: A FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 34, 78-79 (2001).
And Delaware has only three counties, the fewest of any state in the country. Id. at 88.
235. Office of the Maine AG: Homicide, OFF. ME. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.maine.gov/ag/
crime/crimeswe..prosecute/homicides.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
236. Telephone Interview with Stephen Fuller, supra note 216.
237. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7:6 (2003).
238. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 157 (2003). Although I was unable to conduct an interview to
find out more about how the office interprets the discretionary power, the office's trial and investiga-
tive unit states its focus is on "matters that are (1) statewide or multi-jurisdictional in nature,
(2) require significant resources beyond those normally available at the county level, or (3) involve a
conflict of interest for a State's Attorney Office." Office of the Attorney General of Vermont, Trial
and Investigative Unit, OFF. Arr'v GEN., http://www.atg.state.vt.us/officeorganization-information/
office-organization.php (follow "Criminal Division" hyperlink; then follow "Trial and Investigative
Unit" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). In practice, that appears to mean prosecutions that
grow out of the efforts of the Vermont Drug Task Force, which focuses on large-scale drug investi-
gations, child sex assault, computer crimes, serious felonies involving firearms, domestic violence,
and elder abuse. Id. Thus, this office appears to involve itself in a wide variety of matters, such as
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James Tierney notes that having the Maine AG's office handle homicides
is a matter of efficiency, not politics. The handful of prosecutors in the AG's
office who bring homicide cases have developed a specialty in dealing with
these cases and with the two medical examiners who work on these cases in
the state's lone crime lab.239 From the perspective of district attorneys, this
arrangement is also efficient. Because Maine is a rural state, individual dis-
tricts may go years at a time without a homicide, but then get three or four
in one year. Having the AG handle the cases keeps the work at a more con-
sistent level.240 Tierney's description of why the Maine AG handles
homicides thus comports with a view of the state as essentially a local gov-
ernment. With one crime lab and rural counties that may have inconsistent
homicide numbers from year to year, it makes sense to have one office take
responsibility. That it is a state-level office is of little moment because vest-
ing authority at that level of government is not about the need for
centralization or uniformity, but efficiency in light of the state's demograph-
ics.
And to the extent the AGs in New Hampshire and Vermont bring addi-
tional charges that are traditionally brought by local prosecutors,241 that can
be explained in the same way the structure in Delaware and Rhode Island is
explained: New Hampshire, Maine, and Vermont are all relatively sparsely
populated, homogenous states; thus the state-level offices are themselves
representative of a local community. 242
A seventh state, Connecticut, has created a state commission, known as
the Criminal Justice Commission, to select its chief state's attorney2 43 and
domestic violence prosecutions and firearm-related crime, that would in most other places be con-
ducted by prosecutors at the local level.
239. Email from James Tierney, supra note 87.
240. Id.
241. Aside from giving state-level prosecutors responsibility over homicides, neither Maine
nor New Hampshire differ much from other states in terms of the kinds of cases the AG's office
handles: they bring the usual mix of benefits fraud, antitrust, consumer, and environmental cases.
See generally N.H. DEP'T JUST., http://doj.nh.gov/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) (describing Division of
Public Protection); Crimes We Prwsecute, OFF. ME. ATr'Y GEN., http://www.maine.gov/ag/
crime/crimes.weprosecute/index.shtml (listing types of cases prosecuted by the AG). Despite
having the legal right to intervene in local actions, the New Hampshire AG respects the independ-
ence of county prosecutors and rarely gets involved with local matters unless asked. Telephone
Interview with Stephen Fuller, supra note 216. The AG in Vermont, in contrast, appears to bring a
wider variety of cases. See Office of the Attorney General of Vermont, Trial and Investigative Unit,
supra note 238.
242. Vermont has the second-lowest population of any state in the country, at 621,270. State
Rankings: Statistical Abstract of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
compendia/statab/2009/ranks/rank0l.html (published Dec. 8, 2008). Maine and New Hampshire are
approximately the same size, with a population of 1,316,456 and 1,315,809, respectively. Id. They
are thus comparable to a medium-sized city like San Diego. See State & Country QuickFacts: San
Diego, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/statesl06/0666000.html
(last revised Aug. 16, 2010).
243. In Connecticut, the attorney general exercises only civil jurisdiction and lacks authority
to bring criminal prosecutions. The chief state's attorney is the state's chief prosecutor, filling the
criminal law enforcement role that in other states is performed by an attorney general. About Us, ST.
CONN., Div. CRIM. JUST., http://www.ct.gov/csao/ (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 8,
2010).
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the state's attorney for each of its judicial districts.244 The commission is a
state body composed of the chief state's attorney and six gubernatorial no-
minees (two of whom must be judges from the state's superior court) who
have been approved by the state's general assembly.2 45 Thus, to the extent the
state has put the appointment of local prosecutors in the hands of a state
independent agency, there is more state-level involvement in prosecution in
Connecticut than the model followed by most states where local prosecutors
are elected by their communities.
Even with this appointment structure, Connecticut operates in practice
much like other states that give local prosecutors primary responsibility for
criminal law enforcement. The Office of the Chief State's Attorney in Con-
necticut has only a handful of specialized units that handle prosecutions, and
those areas largely mirror the ones seen in other states. 246 The state's attor-
neys retain primary responsibility for bringing almost all criminal
prosecutions in their local districts, with little supervision or oversight by
the chief state's attorney.247 Indeed, state's attorneys can even handle all of
their own appeals if they choose.248 The chief state's attorney cannot inter-
vene in a state's attorney's case unless he or she finds by "clear and
convincing evidence" that the state's attorney is guilty of misconduct or has
a conflict of interest, and the Criminal Justice Commission must agree with
that assessment after receiving written statements from the state's attorney
249
and the chief state's attorney. Moreover, the chief state's attorney cannot
appear in district court on his or her own without getting the consent of the
state attorney in that district.
244. CONN. CONsT. art. XXIII; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-275a (2009). Connecticut's constitu-
tion prior to 1984 vested authority in the state's judiciary to appoint state's attorneys. The state
transferred that authority to an executive branch agency in part because of a concern that it created a
conflict of interest to have the judges before whom prosecutors appear appoint them and in part to
make the state prosecutors more accountable to the public. Judiciary Part 2: Hearing on House
Joint Resolution 35 Before the Joint Standing Committee at 2 (Conn. March 5, 1984) (statement of
Joseph Lieberman, Attorney Gen.; Conn. Gen. Assembly House Proceedings 99 (May 2, 1984)
(remarks of Rep. Tulisano). For its part, the judiciary appeared to endorse the switch because it no
longer wished to retain its powers of appointment. See Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the
Constitution Concerning Appointment of State's Attorneys, Conn. Gen. Assembly, Senate Proceed-
ings at 153 (May 8, 1984) (statement of Sen. Owens).
245. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-275a(a) (2009).
246. The Chief State's Attorney's Office has bureaus to handle prosecutions for Medicaid
fraud, elder abuse, cold cases, political corruption, and crimes that extend beyond one judicial dis-
trict or are "especially time-consuming or require specialized or technical resources," including
environmental and economic crimes. State of Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice, Office of
the Chief State's Attorney, http://www.ct.gov/csao (follow "Index of Programs and Services" hyper-
link; then follow "Chief State's Attorney-Administration and Special Investigative Units"
hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
247. Telephone Interview with Patricia M. Froehlich, State's Attorney's Office (Feb. 4, 2009).
248. Currently state's attorneys in two judicial districts handle their own appeals. Id.
249. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-277(d)(3) (2009). State's attorneys also cannot be removed from
their offices except by the Criminal Justice Commission after due notice and hearing. Id. § 51-
278b(b).
250. Id. § 51-277(d)(2). To the extent that state-level involvement is greater in Connecticut
than elsewhere, it is important to note that like other small states, Connecticut closely approximates
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C. A Few Exceptions
Not every state fits comfortably into the limited authority model. There
are exceptions where states have given a statewide prosecutor greater au-
thority over violent and other crimes that elsewhere are handled
predominantly if not exclusively by local prosecutors. But even though
these states depart from the traditional state approach to a degree worth
noting, they still interfere with local authority far less than the federal
government does.
1. Florida's Statewide Prosecutor
The state that diverges most dramatically from the limited authority
model and most closely approximates the federal approach is Florida. In
1986, Florida amended its constitution to create a position in the attorney
general's office known as the "statewide prosecutor."25 2 Florida vested the
statewide prosecutor with the authority to bring criminal charges in just
about any type of case-from murder to prostitution, robbery to larceny-
as long as the offense occurred "in two or more judicial circuits" or "any
such offense is connected with an organized criminal conspiracy affecting
two or more judicial circuits." 253 Florida created the position because of a
perceived need to address organized crime that transcended the state's cir-
cuit boundaries.254
Unlike other state AGs that use multi-jurisdictional authority sparingly,
the statewide prosecutor in Florida has used his power to prosecute a range
of cases, some of which are more traditionally local matters. Just like the
caseload of other state-level prosecutors, the Florida statewide prosecu-
tor's docket has a large proportion of fraud, white collar, and computer
a local government with a population of just 3.5 million. State Rankings: Abstract of the United
States, supra note 242.
251. Michigan likely belongs in this category. The AG's website indicates that the office han-
dles domestic violence cases in Northern Michigan, firearms-related assaults in Detroit, RICO
prosecutions, and child pornography and internet predator cases. Criminal Prosecutions Bureau,
MICH. ATr'Y GEN., http://www.michigan.gov/ag (follow "About the Office" hyperlink; then follow
"Criminal Justice Bureau" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010). This suggests a robust practice of
violent crime prosecution at the state level. But because no one from the Michigan AG's office
would return repeated calls for more information, I was unable to determine how many cases were
brought in these categories and what the relationship was with local prosecutors in bringing such
cases. The Mississippi AG's office has an Internet Crimes Against Children Unit that brings child
pornography cases over the internet, but because it otherwise leaves violent crimes to local prosecu-
tors, it seems to fit the general profile outlined above. Telephone Interview with Stan Alexander,
supra note 127. Virginia has a similar regime. The AG can bring prosecutions for violations of laws
against child pornography, but most crimes are handled by local prosecutors. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-
511(A) (West 2010); Telephone Interview with Patrick Dorgan, supra note 177.
252. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
253. FLA. STAT. § 16.56(l)(a) (2009).
254. R. Scott Palmer & Barbara M. Linthicum, The Statewide Prosecutor: A New Weapon
Against Organized Crime, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 653, 654-63 (1985).
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crime cases.2s But unlike most other states, Florida has a statewide prose-
cutor who also spends a great deal of time on crimes that are elsewhere
prosecuted locally. One out of five cases brought by the statewide prosecu-
216tor is a narcotics or violent crime case. The office also targets cases
involving gangs,"" and many of its theft cases would be prosecuted locally
in most other states.258
Florida therefore most resembles the federal government in its ap-
proach. Like the federal government2 9 Florida takes a broad view of
organized crime and views it as subject to centralized oversight.
One difference between Florida and the federal government, however,
is that the Florida statewide prosecutor has indicated he will not
bring a case if the local state attorney objects According to the statewide
prosecutor, this "is not generally a large issue" because "[tihe
case-types that make up a majority of our case load are not usually sought
after by the local prosecutors."26 1 While the federal government also typi-
262
cally acts with the consent of local prosecutors, that is not always the
255. In 2005, these categories combined to make up 44% of the office's docket. Letter from
James J. Schneider, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Attorney Gen., State of Fla., to Ed Lintz, New York
University (Mar. 9, 2009) (on file with the author). Another 12% of cases involved identity theft, an
issue also pursued by some other state AGs in recent years. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.231
(West 2010) (AG has concurrent authority with local prosecutors to bring identify theft cases); Miss
CODE. ANN. § 97-45-23 (2010) (AG can bring identity theft prosecutions); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-
1630(A)(10) (2010); Martha Coakley, Privacy Protection, Safety and Security: A State Law
Enforcement Perspective, in 970 COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKs & LITERARY PROP. 970, at 333 (PLI
Course Handbook Series No. 19129, 2009) (describing Massachusetts AG's increasing role in fighting
identity theft); Cyberspace Law, NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'Ys GEN., http://www.naag.org/
cybercrime.php (last visited Aug. 20, 2010) (noting that Cyber Crime Project provided training to AGs
on computer-related crimes, including computer-aided identity theft). In 2006, the same issues
represented 68% of the caseload. Letter from James J. Schneider to Ed Lintz, supra. In 2007, they
represented 61% of the caseload. Id. In that year, the office tracked RICO cases separately, and they
made up an additional 7% of the docket. Id In 2008, 51% of the cases were made up of fraud,
computer crime, identity theft, and other white collar crimes. An additional 11% were RICO cases. Id.
256. Letter from James J. Schneider to Ed Lintz, supra note 255.
257. Id. (gang-related cases made up 3 percent of the caseload in 2008). South Carolina's AG
also has authority to bring charges for gang-related activity. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1630(A)(2)
(Supp 2009). The AG has had this power since 2008, but only one gang crime was prosecuted as of
June 26, 2009. Telephone Interview with Curtis Pauling, supra note 143.
258. See Statewide Prosecution News Releases, OFF. ATT'Y GEN. FLA., http:l
myfloridalegal.com/ (follow "Programs and Units" hyperlink; then follow "Statewide Prosecution"
hyperlink; then follow "News and Releases" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
259. See, e.g., Brief & Short Appendix of the United States, United States v. Leija-Sanchez,
602 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2010), 2009 WL 3867203; Gorelick & Litman, supra note 68, at 976-77.
260. Letter from James J. Schneider to Ed Lintz, supra note 255 (noting that the statewide
prosecutor brings cases "committed by an organized criminal conspiracy affecting multiple Uudicial
circuits]" so long as the local state attorney has no objections).
261. Id.
262. Until the United States Attorneys' Manual was revised in 1997, local prosecutors were
given virtual veto power over U.S. attorneys for certain enumerated crimes. See UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-103.132 ("United States Attorneys are required to obtain
the approval of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division prior to seeking an indict-
ment or filing an information ... if the state or local prosecutor with responsibility for prosecuting a
state charge . . . objects to a federal prosecution."); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, Federal
Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of Traditionally State
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case.263 Thus, even the most aggressive state view of centralized authority
over prosecution is not as far-reaching as that of the federal government.
Despite this important difference, Florida does mirror the federal ap-
proach to a significant extent. If other states followed Florida's pattern, that
would provide evidence that states share the federal government's view of
the proper balance between centralization and local authority. But because
Florida is the only state that closely resembles the federal government, it is
more telling that the other states have rejected anything remotely close to
this model.
2. Alabama's State-Level Review
Alabama also departs from the limited authority model. Alabama vests
power in the attorney general "at any time he sees proper, either before or
after indictment" to "superintend and direct the prosecution of any criminal
case in any of the courts of this state."264 While Alabama's AG could use this
authority to intervene in any local matter, he has traditionally exercised that
power in a more targeted way. The office has established divisions that mir-
ror those seen in states that vest AGs with more limited jurisdiction:
environmental crimes, public corruption, election fraud, bid-rigging, other
261
white collar crimes, and Medicaid and welfare fraud.
Alabama has gone beyond the traditional list, however, in creating a vio-
lent crimes division. This unit brings violent cases not only when district
attorneys have conflicts or request help-a practice common throughout the
states-but also at the request of victims.266 The Alabama AG's office
views its state-level lawyers as " 'prosecutors of last resort' for victims or
family members" 267 who have been turned away by local prosecutors.2 68 For
Crimes, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 921, 966 (1997). Although the United States Attorneys'Manual no
longer requires consent from local prosecutors, some federal guidelines still mandate reliance on
local prosecutions unless federal interests cannot be adequately addressed, giving local prosecutors
a limited power to maintain control of a case. See, e.g., The Matthew Shepard Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 909 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. 3-4 (2009)
(statement of Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen. of the United States) (explaining the DOJ's "backstop
policy" of initially deferring to state and local authorities); UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL,
supra note 22, § 8-3.170, 9-27.240 & 9-61.111 (Dep't of Justice 1997).
263. See Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case
Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 930-36 (2000) (detailing the incentives
and ambiguities that often lead federal prosecutors to expand the reach of their power, regardless of
state prosecutorial interests); see also Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 13, at 262 ("Local prosecu-
tors' willingness to work with federal authorities is a relatively new phenomenon; nexus relations
have a checkered past, with the typical scenario involving aloof or downright hostile relations.").
264. ALA. CODE § 36-15-14 (2010). The attorney general in Alabama also has the authority to
direct district attorneys to "aid or assist in the investigation or prosecution of any case in which the
state is interested." Id. § 36-15-15.
265. Pryor, supra note 127, at 264-69.
266. Telephone Interview with Don Valeska, Division Chief of Violent Crimes, Assistant
Attomey General, Alabama (Jan. 28, 2009).
267. Pryor, supra note 127, at 267.
268. Telephone Interview with Don Valeska, suprm note 266. Although the AG's office has
authority to get involved if a DA has brought a case but the victim is unhappy with how the case is
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instance, at the urging of victims or their families who were dissatisfied
with district attorneys who were not going forward with their cases, the
Alabama AG's office successfully prosecuted a state trooper for murdering
his wife for insurance money, secured a conviction against a county com-
missioner who assaulted his son's high school basketball coach, and brought
charges against a man who murdered his seventeen-year-old wife.269 Thus,
Alabama's state-level prosecutors get involved in areas that are reserved for
local prosecutors in other states. The chief of the unit that handles these cas-
es has explained that Alabama believes this kind of oversight is important to
keep local prosecutors accountable and protect the interests of victims and
270their families.
Alabama's approach is therefore not so much about substantive dis-
agreements with local prosecutors or a view that state-level prosecutors
handle certain categories of cases more effectively. Instead, the Alabama AG
gets involved in cases where it appears that victims are being unjustly ig-
nored, perhaps because of some kind of bias by local prosecutors. The cases
against the county connissioner and the state trooper, for instance, appear
to have stalled at the local level because of a reluctance by local prosecutors
to bring actions against these specific public officials, not because of a con-
sidered view about the merits of the cases. The office requires the victims or
their families who are requesting assistance to write a letter to the AG ex-
plaining why AG involvement is necessary-a process the office uses to
help demonstrate that the AG's involvement is at the urging of individuals,
21
and not for political grandstanding.
3. Arizona's State-Level Drug Enforcement
Arizona's attorney general has authority "when deemed necessary by the
attorney general" to "prosecute and defend any proceeding ... in which the
state ... is a party."272 In many respects, the Arizona AG uses this authority
relatively sparingly. The AG in Arizona, like the AG in most states, has ju-
risdiction over traditional areas such as consumer fraud, white collar crime,
environmental crime, public corruption, and cases where local prosecutors
proceeding, the chief of the unit that handles these cases says that is "relatively rare" and could not
think of an example where it had occurred. Id. Instead, the AG's office typically gets involved in
cases where the DA is not proceeding with the case at all or where the DA asks for help. Id.
269. Pryor, supra note 127, at 267-68.
270. Telephone Interview with Don Valeska, supra note 266. Valeska is "always amazed when
we talk to prosecutors of other states that they don't have that leeway." Id.
271. Id.
272. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-193(A)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
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have conflicts.273 And, despite this sweeping authority, the AG's office does
274
not normally take on violent crimes like homicides or sex offenses.
But the Arizona AG has used this authority to establish a drug unit,
which takes on drug trafficking and money laundering organizations in the
state. Even in its Tucson office, which is quite small,275 drug cases are
276
brought on a regular basis. To be sure, most cases are still brought by
county prosecutors, but because the state-level prosecutor is more involved
in drug cases than in other states, it would not be fair to group Arizona with
the overwhelming majority of state-level prosecutors who leave those cases
277
virtually exclusively with local prosecutors.
III. LEARNING FROM THE STATES
The state relationship with localities contrasts markedly with the federal
relationship with localities in several respects. This Part explores those dif-
ferences. After making these comparisons, this Part explains how sentencing
variation is one of the main drivers of the alternative approaches.
A. The States and Federal Government Compared
Several important differences between states and the federal government
emerge in terms of their relationships with local prosecutors.
1. Centralization Within a Jurisdiction
One important difference between states and the federal government in-
volves centralization within a jurisdiction. Whereas the federal government
has increasingly sought to achieve centralized control of its local outposts
through detailed memos and manuals that specify how local prosecutors
must behave and through centralized approval processes, there has been al-
most no comparable effort in the states. Aside from giving state-level
prosecutors control over appeals to the state's highest court, and thus devel-
opment of the law in the state, most state legislatures allow local authorities
to operate without much oversight in the day-to-day application of that law.
273. About the Office, ARz. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.azag.gov/AboutOffice/#CRM (last
visited Oct. 8, 2010).
274. Telephone Interview with Reina Gallego, Tucson Office, Ariz. Attorney Gen. (June 3,
2009). The office does, however, have authority to prosecute sex offenses against children that span
more than one jurisdiction. ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 21-422(B), 21-427(B) (2010).
275. The office had five prosecutors as of June 2009. Telephone Interview with Reina Galle-
go, supra note 274.
276. Id.
277. The Utah Attorney General's Office has a meth lab unit, so it is also likely bringing drug
cases on a regular basis at the state level. But the meth lab unit is funded through federal money, so
this is not an independent judgment of the state that these cases are particularly appropriate
for state-level enforcement. Criminal Justice Division, UTAH ATT'Y GEN., http://
attomeygeneral.utah.gov/criminaljustice.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010) ("The Meth Lab prosecutors
are funded through federal money . . . .").
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And for their part, state AGs seem content to work cooperatively with local
attorneys without trying to control how state law is meted out in every out-
post. Thus, even though Main Justice has hardly achieved complete control
over U.S. attorneys and local districts still enjoy a degree of autonomy, Main
Justice has sought far more control over its local outposts than state-level
prosecutors have.
The state experience thus provides an alternative model to the one that
has increasingly dominated the interactions between Main Justice and U.S.
attorneys' offices in recent years.2 78 To be sure, important differences exist in
the relationships within the respective sovereigns that give local prosecutors
greater leverage vis-h-vis state prosecutors than U.S. attorneys have vis-h-
vis Main Justice. In particular, local prosecutors have an independent politi-
cal base and budget support that U.S. attorneys lack. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to explore all of these internal differences and the ways in
which they affect the application and uniformity of law within jurisdictions.
But the state experience is at least worth a closer look because states seem
to manage without tight, centralized control.
2. Differences in Substantive Crimes Identified by
Legislators for Central Control
State legislatures differ markedly from Congress in their enforcement al-
location choices. While both levels of government have their share of
symbolic legislation, there are important differences in how those laws get
enforced. As noted in Part I, states have more freedom than Congress does
to dictate enforcement discretion. And most states do not follow the federal
model that gives prosecutors the option of bringing what would otherwise
be local charges at their discretion. Instead of giving statewide prosecutors
the flexibility to bring prosecutions at their discretion, the majority of state
legislatures identify specific categories suitable for the state-level prosecu-
tor. Interestingly, the package of substantive areas repeats itself in state after
state, with public corruption, benefits fraud, and regulatory crimes being
targeted for state-based, as opposed to local, enforcement. Similarly, state
legislatures also have in common a preference for passing laws that give
local prosecutors the right to request assistance from statewide prosecutors
or to allow state prosecutors to step in when there is a conflict. In some
states, state legislatures leave a wider category of cases available to state-
level actors but place a gatekeeping function in the governor or some other
elected official so that state-level prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited.
Congress has also identified public corruption, fraud, and regulatory
crimes as areas suitable for centralized as opposed to local prosecution, and
as in the states, these categories make sense for specialized treatment. Fed-
eral prosecutors and investigators in the FBI and other federal law
278. For a discussion of the relationship between Main Justice and the U.S. attorneys' offices,
see Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007-The Supreme Court Holds-The Center Doesn't,
117 YALE L.J. 1374 (2008).
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enforcement agencies can, like their state-level counterparts, develop exper-
tise in these complex areas whereas local prosecutors may not have a critical
mass of these cases or sufficient personnel to develop the specialized know-
ledge necessary to pursue them effectively. And in the case of public
corruption, federal prosecutors may also be well-situated to address con-
flicts of interest that would exist if states had exclusive jurisdiction to police
corruption within their boundaries.
The difference is that Congress has opted to expand the list of substan-
tive areas that can be taken away from local authorities. Federal gun and
drug laws in particular overlap with large swaths of traditionally local cate-
gories of crime, and broad statutes like RICO2 79 and the Hobbs Act280
similarly allow federal prosecutors to pursue local crimes like murder or
robbery.
3. Differences in the Types of Centralization
There is a third important difference between the federal government's
allocation decisions and those of the states: the kind of involvement with
local practice each has pursued. Some commentators have pointed out that
federal prosecutions bring benefits to local communities otherwise starved
for crime-fighting resources. Particularly in cases involving complex crimes,
the additional resources of the federal government are often highlighted as a
benefit.281' But there is no reason that the federal government has to provide
resource support by assuming responsibility for prosecuting the case.
The state experience demonstrates that resources are easily provided
without having to shift prosecutorial authority. Despite their limited budgets
and resources, state AGs and state-level institutions have offered local juris-
dictions help with everything from electronic surveillance to technical
282
support to additional manpower to prosecutorial training, all without
279. 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (2010).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2010).
281. See, e.g., James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centrali-
zation Efforts in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 219, 223-24 (2008) (noting that one
reason federal prosecutors get involved in matters is that local prosecutors "lack the competence or
motivation" to deal with certain local problems or "the magnitude of the problem or complexity of a
prosecution overwhelms local resources"); Richman, supra note 29, at 783 (noting that local com-
munities can benefit from federal prosecutions because they can use federal resources for
"expensive tools such as electronic surveillance, witness protection, and prosecutorial support for
investigations").
282. See, e.g., Interview by Sam Raymond with Forrest Bright, Dir. of the Wyo. Dep't of
Criminal Investigation (June 3, 2009) (noting that a branch of the AG's office investigates cases but
then turns the cases over to local prosecutors to bring charges); District Attorney Assistance, OR.
DEP'T JUST., http://www.doj.state.or.us/divisions/criminal-justiceindex.shtml (Oregon has a state-
level program that "provides trial and investigative assistance, technical legal and prosecutorial
advice and services, and legal education and training in areas of criminal law and procedure" to
district attorneys); Division of Law Enforcement Services, Wis. DEP'T JUST., http://
www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/ (ensures that local and state police meet recruiting and training qualifica-
tions and provides technical assistance and training); Office of Prosecution Services, Mo. ATT'Y
GEN., http://ago.mo.gov/prosecutors.htm (provides technical assistance to all state prosecutors);
Opinions and Law Resources, MoNT. DEP'T JUST., supra note 140 (provides training and assistance
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assuming control over criminal prosecutions at the state level. There is no
reason the federal government could not follow this same model, as many
283
commentators have advocated. Indeed, the federal government has pro-
vided resource support to states and localities,2 4 but federal funding is slight
compared with state and local needs."' The federal approach has been less
about providing resources than assuming responsibility for the prosecution
of the case or allowing local prosecutors to use the threat of federal in-
216
volvement for greater leverage in their own negotiations with defendants.
4. Differences in How Centralized Prosecutors
Exercise Discretion and Oversight
Finally, even in those states that follow the basic federal framework and
similarly give statewide prosecutors the ability to bring prosecutions at their
discretion, that discretion is getting exercised very differently at the state
level than at the federal level. As Part II explained, this discretionary power
is rarely used in the states to assume control of a matter. Instead, state AGs
maintain uniformity in state law through appellate oversight and seek to
cooperate with local prosecutors on matters of common concern. Federal
prosecutors, in contrast, often step into matters that could otherwise rest
with local authorities by actually assuming control of the cases. So, prosecu-
tors vested with the same discretionary power are making very different
choices about how to exercise it.
to local prosecutors); Resources for Law Enforcement; TEX. ATT'Y GEN., http://
www.oag.state.tx.us/criminallmaincrim.shtml (noting that the AG provides help with "specialized
and technical matters such as computer forensics, complex financial investigations, money launder-
ing, white collar crime, and election fraud" and that its prosecutors will assist county and district
attorneys with difficult areas of criminal law, such as capital murder, election fraud, and public
corruption, at their request); W Va. Prosecuting Inst., http://www.wvpai.org/ (providing training,
legal research, and technical assistance to county prosecutors).
283. See, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 55 (noting that the federal government can sup-
port local crime fighting by providing financial and technical resources); SHAPIRO, supra note 56, at
78 n.l (observing that "[a] good example" of an area in which the federal government should take a
hands-off approach except through grants or revenue support "may well lie in certain areas of crimi-
nal law enforcement involving activity essentially local in its impact"); Beale, supra note 3, at 1008;
Stuntz, supra note 3, at 2025 (noting that today "the federal government is a key source of law" in
state criminal matters when it should instead be "a key source of money, especially for cash-
strapped urban police forces").
284. See Beale, supra note 3, at 1009-10 (describing federal funding for local police and
community-based justice programs as well as FBI technical support for state and local police).
285. For instance, in 2003, state and local expenditures for crime totaled more than $155
billion dollars. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL EX-
PENDITURES FOR CRIME, 2000-2006, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/expgov.cfm (last visited
Oct. 10, 2010). Federal grants in that same year were just over $5 billion, or a little more than 3% of
the total spent by states and localities. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIsTIcs, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003, http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
286. In that way, the federal government is providing a type of resource to localities because
the threat of federal involvement can aid local prosecutors in obtaining pleas and cooperation, which
in turn saves the cost of trials. But that kind of resource support goes to sentencing, as Section III.B
explains.
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B. The Importance of Sentencing Policy
What accounts for the different paths being followed by federal and state
governments? This is obviously a complex topic that requires more than one
article to address. For example, path dependency and cultural norms likely
account for at least part of the differences one sees, but giving that appropri-
ate treatment would require an in-depth analysis of the history and norms
within each jurisdiction and the interactions among all the key players. But
even if interpersonal relationships, culture, and history are playing key roles,
that does not mean that some universal facts might not be driving some of
the stark differences that one sees in nearly every state. Moreover, the fact
that practices in at least some states, such as Florida, and at the federal level
have evolved over the years-and dramatically in recent decades-shows
that path dependency is not a sufficient explanation. Jurisdictions can and do
change their allocation practices. Thus, it is helpful to consider how institu-
tional differences-at both the legislative level and executive level-may
also be driving the dramatic differences one sees in the federal and state
approaches to the allocation of prosecutorial power.
One reason Congress and state legislatures make different decisions is
that, as noted above, federal and state legislators have different choices
available to them. While both have the power to pass symbolic laws-and
both do-state legislators have the freedom to dictate expressly which level
of government is responsible for prosecution. Congress, in contrast, cannot
mandate local prosecutions of federal law.287 If Congress passes a federal
criminal law and wants to see it enforced, federal prosecutors will get the
nod.
But Congress has other options that are comparable to the states. Inter-
vention with local decisions does not need to consist of taking over
prosecutorial power. Instead, Congress could opt to provide resources to
local prosecutors and to use that power of the purse to influence crime pol-
icy. Congress could, for instance, offer financial incentives for states to
bring prosecutions of federal violations, as it has done with Medicare and
Medicaid fraud. It could also spend more money on crime labs, equipment,
or local police forces.88 If witness protection is an issue, Congress could
fund that.
Congress certainly knows how to use this spending power to alter local
policies, but it chiefly uses it to get states to alter sentencing policies. For
example, in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Congress provided incentive grants for states with the goal of encouraging
them to adopt Congress's preferred truth-in-sentencing policy that required
287. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) ("The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' offi-
cers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
288. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3796dd (2006) (creating the Office of Community Oriented Polic-
ing Services, which gives the attorney general the right to allocate grants to local governments);
Richman, supra note 13, at 391-92 (discussing federal funding programs). For a discussion of the
merits of in-kind aid versus direct funding, see Richman, supra note 13, at 401-02.
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violent offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences.2 39 Congress
has also created incentives for states to adopt certain sex offender registra-
tion laws and minimum sentencing terms.290 The Anti Car Theft Act
similarly sought to change state sentencing policy with the promise of fed-
eral grants.
That Congress uses its grant power chiefly to influence sentencing is
telling. Sentencing policy differences are often at the root of the differing
approaches of the states and the federal government in addressing the cen-
tral-local balance. As noted above, local and state prosecutors apply the
same state laws, so there is no set sentencing differential when one or the
other brings the case. In contrast, federal law typically establishes higher
sentences than state law for the same conduct,2 92 so one of the chief motiva-
tors for federal involvement is a different view of what sentence is
appropriate. Congress is often quite explicit about this. For example, when it
passed the Violence Against Women Act that provided a civil remedy for
gender-motivated crimes of violence that were already covered by state law,
it explained that a reason for the intervention was "unacceptably lenient pu-
nishments" for those convicted in state courts.293
It is not just Congress that is making decisions with a focus on sentenc-
ing. That same factor is also the most persuasive explanation for why federal
prosecutors are more likely to use their discretionary power than statewide
prosecutors are in those states where state prosecutors can intervene at their
discretion. When federal prosecutors choose to exercise their discretion to
294bring a prosecution instead of leaving the matter to localities, they are
289. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000).
290. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (making federal funding contingent on state adoption of certain
registration and notification requirements for sex offenders); Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713
(2006) (creating an incentive for states to adopt minimum terms for sex offenders by exempting
states that adopt such sentencing laws from having to reimburse other states that have to prosecute
the parolees of the exempted state).
291. Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3389 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 19 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Teichman, supra note 60, at 1871.
292. TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at 30. Indeed, some federal mandatory minimum sentences
are higher than state maximum penalties. Michael O'Hear, National UniformitylLocal Uniformity:
Reconsidering the Use of Departures To Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IowA L.
REv. 721, 730 (2002).
293. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000); see also Richman, supra note 29,
at 783 (noting that federal prosecution is advantageous for state and local law enforcement because
it "generally result[s] in higher sentences for defendants").
294. Federal prosecutors have the option of bringing charges even when local prosecutors
already have without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the states and federal
government can each charge the same conduct under the dual sovereignty doctrine. But a Depart-
ment of Justice policy, known as the "Petite Policy," discourages federal actions when state
prosecutions have already been brought. This policy precludes the initiation or continuation of a
federal prosecution following a prior state or federal prosecution unless three substantive prerequi-
sites are satisfied. First, "the matter must involve a substantial federal interest;" second, the "prior
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated;" and third, "applying the test
that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government must believe that the defendant's con-
duct constitutes a federal offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to
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making a decision to charge a defendant under a federal law that typically
imposes a more severe sentence, 295 through either a mandatory minimum or
the application of guidelines that have high rates of compliance among fed-
eral judges.296 For example, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
touted the use of the federal RICO law to target gangs because it "is an in-
novative approach to fighting criminals with tough penalties that may be
unavailable in the state system."97 Similarly, when former Attorney General
William Barr announced support for Project Triggerlock, a program that
uses federal firearms laws to prosecute "the most dangerous violent crimi-
nals in each community," he noted that "[v]iolent criminals typically
prosecuted in State court will be prosecuted Federally to take advantage of
stiff mandatory sentences without the possibility of parole." 298 Indeed, the
motto for Project Triggerlock was "[a] gun plus a crime equals hard Federal
time."m9 The U.S. attorney's office in Richmond adopted a similar program,
Project Exile, because it made use of stiffer federal sentences and the federal
prison system, which was likely to mean the offender served his or her time
far from home.3 0 Thus, in the 1990s, the federal government made an "insti-
tutionalized commitment ... to take cases that would have otherwise been
pursued locally" precisely because federal sentences were more severe.
The United States Attorneys'Manual makes this explicit. In advising federal
obtain and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact." In addition, "the prosecution must be
approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General." UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL,
supra note 22, § 9-2.031. Notably, when a local prosecutor has already achieved a conviction under
state law, one factor that can overcome the presumption that the state prosecution was adequate is
that the state sentence was "manifestly inadequate." Id.
295. Beale, supra note 3, at 996-98 (observing that defendants in federal court usually receive
higher sentences than those prosecuted for the same conduct in state court); Miller & Eisenstein,
supra note 13, at 243 (citing an empirical study of cocaine distribution cases in Pennsylvania in state
and federal court from 1997 and 1999 and finding that federal defendants received sentences rough-
ly 2.5 times as long as state court defendants, controlling for drug quantity and prior record).
296. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT, I tbl.1 (de-
tailing that judges are departing downward on their own in only 16.6 percent of cases).
297. Matthew Hardwick Blumenstein, Note, RICO Overreach: How the Federal Govern-
ment's Escalating Offensive Against Gangs Has Run Afoul of the Constitution, 62 VAND. L. REv.
211, 216 (2009) (citing remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales).
298. WILLIAM P. BARR, OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., 1991 ANNUEAL REPORT OF THE Arr'v
GEN. OF THE U.S. 19.
299. Richman, supra note 13, at 396 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
300. Id. at 397-98.
301. Id. at 397 (discussing the "institutionalized commitment" to greater federal involvement
and the importance of federal sentences to that effort); United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 898 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("The government admits that Oakes was prosecuted in federal court primarily because
federal law provides for stiffer penalties and more rigorous forfeiture of defendant's property.");
Gorelick & Litman, supra note 68, at 976-77 (acknowledgement by former high-level Department
of Justice officials that "[t]he availability of stiffer penalties in the federal system is also a potential
comparative advantage" particularly in multi-offender cases where it can be used to induce coopera-
tion); Stephen Labaton, New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al (describing then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York Rudolph Giuliani's federal day initiative-where one day each week, all drug offenders
arrested by the local police were charged with a federal crime- as aiming to increase deterrence
through longer federal sentences).
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prosecutors whether or not to decline to prosecute because a matter could be
brought in another jurisdiction, the manual tells federal prosecutors to con-
sider "[t]he other jurisdiction[']s ability and willingness to prosecute
effectively" and "[t]he probable sentence or other consequences if the person
is convicted in the other jurisdiction.,3 2 The manual reflects the Depart-
ment's view that the two are inextricably linked by explaining that "[t]he
ultimate measure of the potential for effective prosecution in another juris-
diction is the sentence, or other consequence, that is likely to be imposed if
the person is convicted. 303 Thus, the Department's own express policies re-
flect that increased federal involvement in local matters is often based on the
fact that federal prosecutors disagree with state judgments about the appro-
priate sentence for criminal conduct and what makes an "effective"
prosecution.so
To the extent federal procedural advantages are cited as justifying fed-
eral involvement in local crime, those procedural advantages are often
dependent upon the ability of federal prosecutors to credibly threaten defen-
dants with longer sentences to gain cooperation. For example, when John
Jeffries and Judge John Gleeson argue that federal prosecutors do a better
job bringing organized crime cases than state and local prosecutors, they
argue it is because of various aspects of federal law. Although their list of
federal procedural advantages includes the ability to use uncorroborated
accomplice testimony and hearsay evidence before the federal grand jury,
the real driving force aiding federal prosecutors is federal sentencing law.
Jeffries and Gleeson themselves admit as much, noting that "much of the
credit for [federal prosecutors and investigators'] success [against organized
crime] goes to the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines."30' After all, it is the
operation of the guidelines that gets accomplices to testify in the first place,
whether before a grand jury or at trial. Without that threat, the other differ-
ences would not matter nearly as much, if at all. Sentencing therefore drives
302. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 22, § 9-27.240.
303. Id.
304. Even Main Justice's increased oversight of U.S. attorneys' offices in recent years can be
explained in part by a concern with sentencing severity. For example, the Ashcroft Memorandum
instructed federal prosecutors "[to] charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or
offenses that are supported by the facts of the case," thus urging prosecutors to pursue criminal
charges that would yield the longest sentences. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to All
Fed. Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003) (emphasis added), http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2003/
September/03ag516.htm. Similarly, Attorney General Ashcroft's oversight of cases eligible for the
death penalty also seemed most concerned with severity. Although Main Justice has been reviewing
cases that are eligible for the death penalty since 1994, Richman, supra note 278, at 1392, there was
a shift in the direction of that review. Attorney General Reno overruled decisions by U.S. attorneys
for and against the death penalty in about equal numbers, whereas Ashcroft was far more likely to
overrule decisions not to seek the death penalty rather than decisions to pursue it. Gleeson, supra
note 23, at 1697 & n.2 (noting that Reno overruled U.S. attorneys 53 times and in 26 of those cases,
the U.S. attorney had decided not to seek the death penalty; in his first two and half years in office,
Ashcroft overruled U.S. attorneys 40 times and in 33 of those cases, the U.S. attorney had decided
not to seek the death penalty).
305. Jeffries & Gleeson, supra note 62, at 1123.
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much of the federal push for involvement, whether by legislators or prosecu-
tors.
State-level prosecutors, in contrast, are not able to choose different laws
with different sentences than the ones being considered by local prosecutors.
Nor are there procedural differences, because the matters will be brought in
state court regardless of whether the prosecutor is a state or local official. If
there are differences between the two, they are institutional and cultural dif-
ferences about whether one office has more or less resources than the other
and about whether the local community has a greater or lesser interest than
the state. Thus, when a statewide prosecutor has discretion to bring a prose-
cution but chooses not to, the statewide prosecutor is concluding that
institutional differences are not sufficient and if anything, the better course
is to leave matters with local prosecutors and to provide resource support if
needed. That explains why out-and-out intervention tends to occur only
when there is evidence of local corruption or a conflict of interest, or in sub-
stantive areas where the state interest is strong, such as with regulatory and
business crimes that affect the entire state economy and not just the local
community.
This is not to say that when the federal government intervenes in local
matters to pursue higher sentences, it does so without local approval. On the
contrary, local and federal prosecutors often cooperate on cases.0 Local
prosecutors are typically quite happy to have federal prosecutors take on
local cases so that defendants receive longer sentences, and they often will-
ingly use the prospect of federal prosecution to gain leverage in their own
plea negotiations with defendants. 08 Local police officers also often prefer
the federal option for the same reasons. But it is not necessarily the case
that local officials making these assessments reflect the views of the larger
electorate in a community. Nor is there any assurance that they are selecting
306. Differences in the jury pool may be driving some decisions to go to federal court, see
supra note 67, but one rarely sees that admitted openly. After all, if that is the motivating factor, then
federalization would be based on the desire to create less-diverse juries that do not represent the
community in which the crime occurred. It is hard to imagine anyone condoning a theory of federal
involvement on that basis.
307. Miller & Eisenstein, supra note 13, at 252-59. In some instances, state prosecutors can
be designated as federal prosecutors and try the federal cases. See Brickey, supra note 15, at 1159-
60.
308. Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment: Presumption of
Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 Thx. L. REV. 1203, 1250 (2006) (noting how the
threat of federal prosecution benefits state prosecutors in their plea bargains); Miller & Eisenstein,
supra note 13, at 243, 254-59; Richman, supra note 29, at 783 (observing that "[tihe threat of fed-
eral charges carrying higher effective penalties can be used by state prosecutors to extract guilty
pleas from defendants in their own system").
309. See, e.g., Testimony Before the United States Sentencing Commission, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/20090709/Kelly-testimony.pdf (July 10, 2009) (testimony of
Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner, New York, New York) (noting the value of stricter federal
sentences in getting "a number of suspects to give up information"); Regional Hearing Before
the United States Sentencing Commission, available at http://www.ussc.gov/AGENDAS/
20090210fTranscript.pdf (Feb. 10-11, 2009) (testimony of Larry Casterline, Chief of Police, High
Point, North Carolina) (noting that federal jurisdiction is the "most effective tool ... to deter repeat
and serious drug offenders").
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the right cases for this differential sentencing treatment or that allowing cas-
es to be handpicked for harsher treatment comports with notions of due
process or federalism.1 o And of course, there remains the substantive issue
of whether federal involvement and the higher sentences it brings, on bal-
ance, produce better policy.
The point here is not to answer the questions of whether federal sen-
tences are more appropriate or should be used as bargaining chips in select
cases, but to highlight that this, in fact, is the question that we should often
be asking when we talk about federalism and crime. The different approach
to federal and state relationships with localities largely boils down to this
difference: the federal government-Congress and prosecutors-largely
decides to prosecute crimes that could be handled locally on the belief,
which may be shared by local law enforcement officials, that federal sen-
tences (and, to a lesser extent, procedures) are preferable to state sentences.
In the states, questions of procedure and sentencing are irrelevant to the al-
location-of-power decision because they are the same at both levels of
government. States thus serve as laboratories where sentencing differences
and variation in procedural rules are largely taken out of the equation. What
is left is a question of institutional competence assuming the same rules.
And when that is the question, states are overwhelmingly of the view that it
makes more sense to leave matters to local control except in the handful of
areas where the nature of the crime makes more centralized enforcement
appropriate, particularly crimes where local enforcers might have a conflict
of interest or areas that require specialization that a centralized office is
well-suited to develop, such as regulatory crimes. To the extent the federal
government intervenes in these same categories, it shares the states' view of
institutional competency, and there is much to support that view in those
311
cases.
But unless just about every state is mistaken-and, as noted, there are
independent reasons besides consensus to believe the states are getting it
right (in particular, incentives to focus on competency and the fact that they
bear the costs of those decisions)-the federal government is reaching far-
ther than institutional competency suggests it should. And the main reason
appears to be sentencing. Federalism seen this way, then, is not really about
federalism at all, but instead is about sentencing law and policy. To the ex-
tent this is correct, sentencing policy should be the focal point in analyzing
federal criminal prosecutions that touch on traditionally local concerns.
310. For a discussion of how the discretion of federal prosecutors to pick and choose the cases
that are subject to harsher federal punishment may present equal protection concerns, see Steven D.
Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1997).
311. There is also no serious debate or disagreement with the federal government addressing
crime that "intrudes upon federal functions, harming entities or personnel acting in a federal capac-
ity, or when it addresses offenses committed on sites where the federal government has territorial
responsibility, or when it addresses matters of international crime." TASK FORCE, supra note 10, at
47.
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CONCLUSION
The states and the federal government both assess the value of local con-
trol over crime when they make decisions about whether to centralize or
decentralize power. But while the value of local prosecutorial power is the
same in both contexts, it is being weighed against different variables. At the
state level, centralization brings its values of uniformity, consistency, and
the possibility for specialization. In most cases, states have found those val-
ues are not enough to trump the benefits of local law enforcement. To be
sure, there are areas where institutional competence pushes the states toward
centralization, and here, again, the uniformity is striking. Public corruption,
regulatory crimes, and matters where local prosecutors have conflicts make
up the AG's docket in most states precisely because the benefits of bringing
those cases at a higher level of government outweigh the costs to local au-
tonomy. To the extent the federal government focuses on these same areas, it
can also be explained as a reliable weighing of institutional competence."'
But the federal government weighs more than just institutional compe-
tence in making decisions about whether to take on an area of criminal law.
It also considers the value of having a different set of sentencing policies.
This disagreement over sentencing policy goes a long way toward explain-
ing why the federal government has intervened in a host of areas of
traditional local control that states have left untouched and why federal in-
volvement goes beyond resource support.
The debate over the federalization of crime, viewed in this light, thus
boils down to a question of sentencing policy and whether (and when) it is
appropriate for the federal government to step into an area of traditional
local authority over crime because of a differing view of sentencing policy.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to make substantive comparisons be-
tween federal and state sentencing laws in those areas where the federal
government has opted to intervene and the states have not.m'
But it is the goal of this Article to shift attention to the fundamental role
that sentencing is playing in choices about federalization. With all the atten-
tion in federalism debates to constitutional history and institutional
competence, it is easy to overlook or discount the role of sentencing in ac-
tual allocation decisions. But the state experience reveals that sentencing is
likely the driving force in the federal government's determination to take
312. This would also be true of those offenses involving unique national concerns that do not
present themselves as questions of localism, such as offenses against the federal government itself,
corruption cases involving state actors, and criminal activity with international dimensions. The
Judicial Conference has identified these areas as appropriate for federal involvement. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTs: As AP-
PROVED BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 23-24 (1995).
313. For an argument that the political process in the states is more likely to produce sound
sentencing outcomes than the federal political process, see Barkow, supra note 8, at 1299-312. This
is consistent with other research on the advantages of local control over law enforcement. Bill
Stuntz recently described the historical connection between local control and more egalitarian pun-
ishment schemes. As he puts it, "In our time, centralized democratic power seems associated with
discrimination and severity," whereas "[i]n the past, local democratic control of criminal justice
appears to have produced equality and lenity." Stuntz, supra note 3, at 1975.
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greater charge of criminal matters from localities in those areas where the
states have opted not to intervene. Endorsing federal involvement in those
areas thus should depend to a large extent on whether one believes the fed-
eral government is more likely to set the "correct" levels of punishment.
That is a different debate than the one that has dominated the federalism
literature, but my hope is that this Article will help get that conversation
started.
